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Preface
One of  the most striking features of  the political developments during the 1990s 
was the re-emergence of  regional conflicts that seemed to be very forgotten dur-
ing the Cold War. Indeed, something of  regional identities were also created and 
reinforced in many parts of  the world, making room for both promising devel-
opments (like the European Union) and more worrying tendencies. For many 
observers this development called for a deeper understanding of  cultural and 
historical patterns, as well as a more hands-on need of  knowledge of  current re-
gional dynamics. The importance of  the MENA region, Central and Eastern Asia, 
and the former Soviet republics Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, made it necessary 
for a broader access traditionally reserved for area experts.
This development also called for a framework for analysis and policy. Even if  “re-
gionalism” was a catchword already during the Cold War, its meaning was some-
times blurry or provided little help since it fell under the shadow of  the super 
power confrontation. The new regional approach seemed to make more sense, 
even if  people in the regions themselves were not surprised and often had deeply 
held memories of  conflicts and cooperations on a regional basis. The flourishing 
of  this perspective gave regional and sub-regional organizations like NATO, EU, 
ASEAN, the African Union and ECOWAS the opportunity to find expanded and 
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redefined roles. Furthermore, a strategic thinking on risks and challenges became 
more and more apparent.
The New Faces Conference 2005 “Security Challenges in Times of  Change—Re-
gional Options for Cooperation and Development” addressed these very issues. 
The yearly New Faces Conference gathers some twenty promising strategic 
scholars and practitioners—this year including participation from twenty differ-
ent countries from all over Europe, the Middle East, Russia, North America and 
Asia. The idea is to provide an arena for dialogue as well as challenging debates 
while also giving opportunities to expand and extend the network between these 
young leaders.
The New Faces Conference concept is the second step in a three-pronged ap-
proach of  the Forum on European Foreign and Security Policy of  the German 
Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). While promoting a European perspec-
tive on foreign and security policy, the Forum aims at bringing together future 
decision-makers in different stages of  their career, and has been successful in 
establishing a lasting sustainable international network. Alumni of  the Forum are 
found internationally and in an increasing degree in key positions in diplomacy, 
academia, business, as well as leading think tanks. The 2005 Conference also 
paved the way to the launch of  the Forum’s consequent successor institution, the 
DGAP International Forum on Strategic Thinking, established in 2006.
The New Faces Conference 2005 took place on 30 September to 2 October in 
cooperation with the Swedish International Institute of  International Affairs 
(SIIA), the Norwegian International Institute of  International Affairs (NUPI), 
and the Military Academy Karlberg. The event took place at the wonderful loca-
tion of  Karlberg Palace in Stockholm, Sweden. The conference had an ambition 
to cover both introductory discussions on the term security and the major play-
ers in regional security, as well as four panels on regional case studies. The first 
debates elaborated on the nature of  threats in both soft and hard dimensions, 
the broader security agenda after the Cold War, regional patterns of  conflict 
and cooperation, as well as regional and international organizations that aspire 
to handle different security challenges. The case studies provided an interesting 
insight into the intricate character of  cooperation and conflict in a few of  regions 
on the agenda in world politics. Participants from the regions in question gave 
an extra dimension to the discussions about Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the 
Middle East, and East Asia. The speakers showed great insight and knowledge on 
the topic, and the presentations assembled in this volume are indeed a substantial 
contribution. The contributions mirror the inspiring mixture of  academics and 
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
 
New Faces Conference 2005
practitioners in their varying approaches and styles. This volume also includes an 
interesting contribution from Alyson Bailes of  the Swedish International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), held at the opening dinner.
We would like to thank everyone without which the Forum or this report would 
not have been possible. The generous support of  the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the 
keen supporter of  the New Faces Conference since 1997, needs to be especially 
credited. Other supporting institutions that we extend our gratitude to include 
NATO, the Swedish Institute (SI), the German Federal Foreign Office, and The 
German Marshall Fund of  the United States. The Swedish Armed Forces pro-
vided basic logistics as well as transportation during the event.
We hope that with this collection of  views from emerging scholars and practitio-
ners in the field of  international security, we provide a timely contribution to the 
ongoing debate about the best ways to cope with security challenges in times of  
change.
Berlin and Stockholm, September 2007
May-Britt Stumbaum Magnus Christiansson
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Regional Security Against New and Old Threats:  
Europe as Model, Laboratory or Warning?
Alyson J. K. Bailes
The only article I ever managed to publish in the “NATO Review” was called 
“Sub-Regional Organizations: the Cinderellas of  European Security?.” Even today, 
my own devotion to the study of  regional security processes is driven partly by 
my feeling that they are still treated as Cinderellas by all too many other people: 
and I suspect that one of  the reasons is a certain suspicion of  intellectual fuzzi-
ness around the subject. For a start, in French and English and in Brussels-speak 
we have the confusion between a “region” within one country and a “region” 
made up of  several countries. Traditional “regional studies” are something dif-
ferent; and we should be wary about the words “regionalization” and “regional-
ism”, which belong more in the field of  economic and social analysis and can 
carry negative overtones. What I assume we want to talk about here are active 
and deliberate processes of  multi-state regional cooperation, connected in some 
way with security, which are typically led by national governments but often 
most successful when they involve other layers of  society. And here we come 
to the second part of  the problem, which is that when such processes succeed, 
they tend to produce frankly boring results. Conflicts between states stop; other 
conflicts are contained and the impact of  other threats reduced; the biggest fights 
that take place are word-fights between weary politicians after all-night meetings, 
and the most painful disputes are over how to share out the profits or over how 
many more members to let into the club. You do not have to be wildly macho or 
the old, military-obsessed kind of  security analyst to feel that studying North Ko-
rea may be more interesting than Vietnam nowadays, or Ukraine more interest-
ing than Slovenia, after the bland influences of  ASEAN and the EU respectively 
have done their work.
As G. K. Chesterton once wrote, however, an arrow that hits its target is actually 
far more surprising and exciting, and should be more emotionally moving, than 
one that misses. I have argued throughout my time at SIPRI that we need to de-
vote more effort to studying what works; and it’s in that spirit that I’d like to pick 
up two particular issues now—
– whether and how the practice of  regional security cooperation has adapted 
itself  to the quickly changing constellation of  security challenges; and
– what is the significance of  the European Union, the oldest of  what I would 
call the “new generation” of  regional organs, for the other (steadily multi-
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plying) efforts at security-through-integration that are going on around the 
world.
I will also comment briefly at the end on issues raised by the apparently unstop-
pable spread of  the regional security virus for the larger picture of  world security 
governance.
“Old” and “New” Security, “Old” and “New” Regionalism
During the Cold War, two equally matched superpowers and two blocs who were 
each others’ military and ideological enemies dominated the security scene in Eu-
rope. This confrontation cast its shadow over most other parts of  the world, with 
equally polarizing effects. The dominant security worries were about open war 
between states and groups of  states, and there were four basic ways that regional 
cooperation could try to cope with this:
(i) by binding local states together so that at least they would not fight each 
other;
(ii) by binding them together to balance and deter the enemy—these first two 
functions of  course combined by NATO, but also for a while by CENTO 
and SEATO in Western and South-East Asia;
(iii) by creating a structure around two opposing blocs that reduced the risks of  
their competition and allowed some cooperation as well: a role quite success-
fully played by the CSCE and then the OSCE in Europe;
(iv) to keep a group of  states out of  the main confrontation and shield them 
from its effects: this was the role of  the Neutral and Non-Aligned Move-
ment, but it is quite a rare variant and doesn’t require all the members to 
come from the same region.
Now, the major changes that have taken place in the security agenda during the 
last phases of  the Cold War and since it finished will be well known to you all. 
There are three points I would particularly pick out:
– the shift from risks of  inter-state conflict to intra-state conflicts, with their 
dangers both for security and humanity; this has gone together with a rise 
in positive and active military cooperation, even between former opponents, 
and with a demand that the more fortunate states of  the world should not 
just look after their own security but help in exporting it to others;
– the growing prominence of  worries about non-traditional threats ranging 
from terrorism, crime and WMD proliferation, through various kinds of  
Europe as Model,  
Laboratory or Warning?

 
New Faces Conference 2005
natural catastrophe and disease, to social and economic problems ranging 
from starvation to infrastructure collapse;
– new awareness of  the interconnectedness of  all these threats and risks, both 
in their causes and effects, and the multiple vulnerability it creates both for 
richer and poorer communities,
In the early 90s people used to wonder whether these changes would make old-
style defensive alliances like NATO redundant. By now we have seen, not just 
that old alliances can learn new and more constructive tricks, but also that the 
new environment has offered new rationales for regional cooperation. To men-
tion just two,
– states can get together to “export security” more effectively, in all its differ-
ent forms just mentioned;
– and they can get together against all the new non-military varieties of  chal-
lenge and threat: to protect their own lands and peoples against them, and to 
make a stronger input to the global policies and responses that they demand. 
(In the economic dimension, we may note the parallel issue of  how far 
regional integration can help its participants to deal with the notorious chal-
lenges of  economic globalization.)
May-Britt Stumbaum, and Alyson J. K. Bailes (left to right)
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The question of  democracy, and of  reform and transformation more generally, 
has also come into the picture in a big way. Even old-style groups like NATO 
created pressure on their members to be democratic and to behave democrati-
cally towards each other. With today’s wider security agendas it has become more 
obvious how security, good governance and democracy are related: apart from 
anything else, many new challenges need the willing and effective help of  private 
actors right down to the individual level, which is problematic both in weak and 
oppressive states.  So we find the enlargement of  institutions like NATO, the EU 
and ASEAN—and even their less integrated “partnership” frameworks—being 
used consciously as way to promote democratization and reform in neighbor-
ing states and through key strategic dialogues like that with China. We find the 
new African Union, in its admirable basic documents, linking seamlessly together 
the ideas of  conflict avoidance and control, of  democratic governance, and of  
sustainable development. We find a new explicit recognition among both conflict 
management experts and development analysts that bringing a weak or wounded 
state into a stable framework of  security cooperation with its neighbors is one of  
the best ways to boost its progress and ensure a lasting recovery.
New threats for the integrated regions cannot, however, be countered with old 
tools and I would highlight four new practical demands that they have brought to 
the fore:
– unlike military alliances, multilateral security approaches to the new agendas 
demand relatively high and constant inputs of  money and other resources, 
and are pushing towards increasing centralization and collective use of  these; 
– challenges involving non-state actors and individual persons can only really 
be mastered with the help of  individually applicable laws and norms, formu-
lated within states as well as between them;
– the interconnectedness of  many of  the threats gives an advantage to group-
ings that can combine military competencies with other security ones, and 
both of  these with political, economic and other functional capacities;
– respectable regional organizations, as much as nations, are increasingly called 
on to show their relevance to the whole world both by “exporting security” 
and by collaborating on the universal generic challenges.
The European Union
All these last four desiderata—resources, legislative capacity, multi-functional 
competence and global outreach—are all combined at least in theory in the 
European Union. No other European body has them all: NATO doesn’t have 
any significant collective budget or law-making capacity, and OSCE has only 1 of  
Europe as Model,  
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the 4, i.e. multi-functional competence. I think people in other regions see just 
as well or even better than we do the importance both of  having these tools and 
of  combining them for the right security effect – even if  for their own regional 
organizations, this is still much more of  an aspiration than a viable program.
In this situation, the EU seems to be providing both a model and encouragement 
for other regions to move ahead and go deeper in integration, and a lot of  food 
for thought on what not to do or on what could be done better. 
In reality, though, how useful can the EU be as a source book for regional design 
in quite different regions of  the world?  Problems of  widely different cultures, 
histories and economic levels might come to mind, but I’m not sure that this 
is the real point. Culturally similar and culturally diverse groups of  states, and 
groups that are all poor or all rich or rather mixed, can achieve and have achieved 
workable forms of  security community. If  we need to offer warnings about the 
“exportability” of  the EU model, I think they belong at a broader level of  analysis. 
I have already hinted at one of  them, i.e. that our Union has been working in the 
field of  true integration longer than anyone else, and like any pioneer is bound to 
have run straight into all the traps that others should learn to avoid. Among other 
things, it created a single market and an almost single immigration space long be-
fore it realized how those arrangements would expose its citizens to transnational 
threats like terrorism, crime and disease, let alone set about developing collective 
responses to those challenges. It started off  with a complicated set of  institutions 
and was slow and often clumsy in redesigning them to deal better with new de-
mands, notably including the demand for tight cross-functional coordination and 
for a single face and voice in dealing with the outside world. Here I would like 
to highlight, however, two other sets of  issues that are very much alive in debate 
among Europeans themselves.
First is the question of  how larger and smaller states can work together. The 
West Europeans in the 1940s decided to conduct their military cooperation with 
the USA, which indeed was the only way to keep the Soviet threat at bay, but they 
set up their deeper economic (and eventually political) cooperation only among 
themselves. The subsequent story of  the EU suggests that progress in integra-
tion is relatively easy in a region that has no single dominant state but a balance 
among two, three, or more larger ones; and this same diagnosis could be supplied 
in broad terms to the relative success of  the Latin American organizations, the 
African Union and ASEAN. But the EU as such doesn’t offer any answers—and 
NATO has never really found a permanent and satisfactory one—on how to 
build successful cooperation where there is one much larger state in the neigh-
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borhood and it cannot simply be excluded from the exercise or treated in the 
older style as an enemy. That is the challenge with Saudi Arabia in the Gulf  
Cooperation Council, with India in South Asia and with China in the East, and 
also in the former Soviet space where Russia’s attempts since 1990 to re-create a 
security community have never really delivered the goods either for itself  or for 
others.
Secondly and last is the problem of  popular consent and support. All regional 
structures dealing with security need to be led by national governments so long 
as the prime formal, and practical, responsibility for security lies at the govern-
mental level. But it is all too easy for cooperation then to become the property 
of  elites and to develop in a “club” atmosphere from which ordinary people in 
the region, as well as those outside, feel excluded. For the results, you need only 
look as far as the debacle over approval of  the draft EU Constitution: but there 
is a broader point that organizations claiming to protect and promote democ-
racy can risk their whole credibility when their own stake-holders find them 
undemocratic. The EU has plainly not solved this challenge and other regional 
groups should ponder hard on its lessons. Of  course effective security work has 
its own disciplines, and it will rarely make sense to hand over operational control 
to parliaments, let alone to delegate further.  But what the EU’s leaders, and all 
other regional leaders, do need to think about is a combination of  informing and 
consulting ordinary people better about the security aspect (and all other aspects) 
of  regional integration: and mobilizing and engaging them better especially in the 
newer areas of  security creation and emergency control.
A “World of Regions”?
A last word on what all this means for the global security structure and secu-
rity governance. Today we have one super-power and it is not in any real sense 
“regionalized”. Indeed many Americans see regional organizations as a challenge 
to themselves, a deliberate attempt to balance and limit US power or to make the 
world more “multi-polar”. As I see it, the EU and all the more successful regional 
groups exist first and foremost to meet their own people’s needs; and they often 
realize that those needs can best be met by constructive cooperation or comple-
mentarity with the USA. Any more defensive points in their thinking are likely to 
be about avoiding American bullying or divide-and-rule tactics on their own ter-
ritory, or being able to make their case against the US when necessary in fora like 
the WTO—which is hardly unreasonable. In the big picture, however, it is clearly 
harder to find ways of  running the world that are efficient and fair to everyone 
when we have such a messy combination of  single (non-integrated or imperfectly 
integrated) big powers; a few successfully integrated or integrating regions; and 
Europe as Model,  
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other regions like the greater Middle East, South Asia and East Asia where states 
of  more modest size are creating dangers for themselves and the world precisely 
because they haven’t yet found or even sincerely tried to find a working regional 
formula. Shouldn’t those of  us who believe in the regional method be trying a 
good deal harder, if  nothing else, to tackle that last problem and to find some 
better way of  talking to the US about it?
Lunch in Artillery Hall
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Russia’s “Energy Superpower”:  
Between Realpolitik and New State Idea
Andris Spruds
Russia has become one of  the most significant global energy suppliers. Although 
the interpretations of  motivation and guiding principles for Russia’s energy 
strategy differ, Russia’s leadership obviously attempts to take advantage of  the 
country’s important role in global energy markets and economy, in general. The 
questions, however, must be raised constantly what are the international and 
domestic interests of  Russia and, especially, whether the perceptions abroad and 
at home of  the nation’s elevated role are being shaped deliberately or inadver-
tently. In the context of  the growing demand for energy resources and necessity 
to define parameters of  energy security, it is imperative to identify the character, 
principles and driving force of  Russia energy policy and prospective potential for 
“energy partnership” between Russia and Western democracies.
Russia’s “Gas and Oil Diplomacy”
Russia may be dubbed a “great energy power” or even “energy superpower”, if  
one takes into account the amount of  its energy resources. Russia produces 12% 
of  the world’s primary energy resources, possesses 13% of  the known global oil 
reserves and around one third of  known gas reserves.1 This makes Russia, if  not 
the global, then the regional “swing state”, which may stabilize the volatile global 
and especially regional, namely European, energy markets. Despite a considerable 
depletion of  the existing extraction sites and growing need for substantial finan-
cial investments and modernization of  infrastructure, the natural resources give 
Russia attributes of  a comparative advantage in global economic and political 
affairs. As the result, the Russian leadership has been inclined to utilize its energy 
resources to implement “gas and oil realpolitik” with the aim to maximize its 
political and economic influence on the global arena and especially in the neigh-
bouring countries. Hence, a gradual and apparent shift is observable in Russian 
international orientation towards deliberately turning itself  into a principal energy 
player in the global economy, which would allow gaining both economic and 
political dividends. It is also becoming increasingly apparent of  what means and 
strategy is envisaged by Russia’s leadership in order to lead Russia to the status of  
the pre-eminent “energy superpower.”
1 Alexander Arbatov, Maria Belova, Vladimir Feygin, Russian Hydrocarbons and World Markets, in: Russia in Global 
Affairs, No. 1/2006. Russia controls around 47 trillion cubic meters proven natural gas reserves. In comparison, the 
largest European gas producers Norway and the Netherlands own 4 and 1.5 trillion cubic meters, respectively.
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The Kremlin, first of  all, constructs the basis for its international realpolitik at 
the domestic level. Russian government has consequently pursued the domestic 
policy of  turning the Russian state into a major player within the energy sector. 
The consolidation of  state standing in and control over Russia’s energy sector 
has been especially advanced during Putin’s second presidential term. The state 
has strengthened its monopoly over the gas sector and considerably increased its 
presence in the oil industry. The Khodorkovski case was a clear manifestation 
of  the determination on the Kremlin’s side to dominate the energy sector and 
to make energy companies instrumental in its aspirations for ensuring economic 
growth and international political potency.2 Russia’s government had made it clear 
that it would support the socially and politically “responsible” Russian companies 
on the domestic and international scene. And vice versa, those companies, which 
would pursue incompatible political, economic or energy agendas, would face a 
risk of  “disapproval” by the state authorities. The re-structuring and activities 
of  Russia’s gas monopoly Gazprom exemplifies the Kremlin’s intentions to cre-
ate “national industrial champions”, which could become a major instrument of  
Russia’s external energy policy and contribute to Russia’s national interests. Putin 
has clearly identified Gazprom’s linkage with the state: “The gas pipeline system 
is the creation of  the Soviet Union. We intend to retain state control over the gas 
transportation system and over Gazprom. We will not divide Gazprom. And the 
European Commission should not have any illusions. In the gas sector, they will 
have to deal with the state.”3 This also pinpoints to the trend of  Russia’s energy 
diplomacy, and especially gas diplomacy deliberately and increasingly being used 
as the central pillar of  Russian foreign policy.
The Russian government possesses a number of  means to maximize its bilateral 
and multilateral standing, bargaining powers and space for political and economic 
manoeuvres. The diversification of  strategic transportation routs of  Russian 
energy resources, signing long term bilateral supply as well as joint exploration 
and investment contracts with European and non-European state and private 
companies, obtaining industrial energy assets in foreign countries and controlling 
or influencing transportation of  the energy resources by third parties apparently 
represents an important and integral part of  Russia’s “gas and oil diplomacy”. 
Russia’s relative standing and its determination to utilize its advantages has been 
2 Marta Olkot, Vladimir Putin i neftyanaya politika Rossii, Carnegie Working Paper, No. 1/2005, p. 4.
3 Quoted in Michael Fredholm, The Russian Energy Strategy and Energy Policy: Pipeline Diplomacy or Mutual Depen-
dence? (Conflict Studies Research Center, Swindon), September 2005, p. 9.
4 Keith C. Smith, Russian Energy Politics in the Baltics, Poland and Ukraine: A New Stealth Imperialism? (CSIS Report), 
Washington, DC, December 2004.
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facilitated by the increasing global demand and rising prices on energy resources 
at the turn of  the century.5
A diversification strategy clearly may become one of  the most effective tools of  
Russia’s energy realpolitik. Diversification was commenced in the oil sector by 
constructing the Baltic Pipeline System effectively allowing Russia to bypass the 
Baltic countries, above all, the Ventspils port in Latvia, which in the 1990s was 
crucial for stable Russia’s oil exports to European countries. Russia considerably 
decreased the transit costs and, more importantly, turned the previously existing 
asymmetric relations upside down. Prior to the construction of  the Baltic Pipe-
line System, the Baltics were indispensable transit countries for export of  Russian 
energy resources. From now on, in the context of  the diversification of  Russian 
energy export routes, instead of  setting prices for transit, the Baltic countries 
primarily aspire, though mostly unsuccessfully, to retain some elements of  the 
previously important role in the transit sector. However, it is clear that mutual 
interdependence in the energy sector has been transformed into obvious energy 
dependence of  the Baltic countries on Russia. This contributes to the creation of  
circumstances, when Russia is increasingly in the position to demand that energy 
5 During the period between 1992 and 1999, the average price for the barrel of  Brent crude oil was $ 17.6, whereas in 
2000–2005 it was $ 35.4. The high oil and gas prices contributed considerably to Russia’s ability to pay off  foreign 
debts and, moreover, to increase its bank reserves and gradually approach a hundred billion dollar accumulation in 
Stabilization fund.
Conference Participants
 
New Faces Conference 2005 1
Russia’s 
“Energy Superpower”
cooperation is preconditioned by certain political stances of  the Baltic govern-
ments.6
In the gas sector, having implemented the Blue Stream project to Turkey, Rus-
sia actively promoted the implementation of  the extensive North European Gas 
Pipeline, now, the Nord Stream project. It must be clearly viewed in the con-
text of  the transforming priorities of  Russia’s domestic and foreign policy. The 
construction of  the Nord Stream obviously corresponds with the endeavours to 
turn Russia into a potential European and global “energy superpower.” Diver-
sification may contribute to Russia’s reduced dependence on Ukrainian transit 
routes. Ukraine has been imperative for Russian gas exports to Europe. Although 
Ukraine will continue to serve as a dominant Russian gas export corridor after 
the new pipeline starts to operate, Russia’s dependence on the former would be 
lessened from almost 80% to approximately 65% of  natural gas exports.7 As a 
result, political dividends are also obvious. Russia has effectively obtained ad-
ditional instruments for both economic and political “carrot and stick” policies 
with respect to the transit countries, above all Ukraine, and extended its scope of  
political and economic manoeuvring and bargaining powers.
Apparently, the Russian leadership and Gazprom have calculated primarily the 
potential strategic economic and political benefits rather than pending costs and 
prospects of  financial sustainability of  the project. The pursued gains of  the pro-
spectively strengthened presence in West European energy sector and increased 
political manoeuvring in Central and East European countries outweighed con-
siderations of  the economic feasibility of  the project itself. The Russian gas mo-
nopoly has already established itself  as a major energy player in Central and East 
European countries and partly monopolized their gas markets. Gazprom increas-
ingly dominates the whole industry from extraction to distribution to individual 
consumers there and it holds considerable shares in national gas companies in 
Central and East European countries. Although in the presence of  established 
players similar influence would be impossible to achieve in West European energy 
sector, Gazprom seeks to intensify its connections with large European energy 
companies by signing long-term supply agreements, establishing joint extraction 
and transportation ventures, and implementing joint investment projects in other 
countries. If  in Central and East European countries Russia aims to increase their 
6 Andris Spruds, Latvian-Russian Energy Relations: Between Economics and Politics, in: Nils Muiznieks (ed.), Latvian-
Russian Relations: Domestic and International Dimensions, Riga 2006, pp. 110–118.
7 According to the Renaissance Capital Group estimates, the distribution of  annual output capacity of  export pipelines 
in 2010 (altogether 257 billion cubic meters as compared to 190 in 2004) will be the following: Ukrainian transit 170 
(145 in 2004), Yamal-Europe (through Belarus) 33 (23), NEGP 30 (0); Blue Stream 16 (16) and Nordic (Finland’s) 
direction 8 (6); see: Situaciya na evropeiskom gazovom rinke, in: Biuleten instituta energetiki i finansov, No. 2/2006, 
p. 15.
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dependence, then the objective in Western Europe is an increased mutual interde-
pendence.
Furthermore, trends in the foreign policy and energy establishment exist that 
facilitate a “geopolitical revolution.” Instead of  regional “energy diplomacy”, the 
“geopolitical revolution” would be the major objective of  a much more global in 
scope realpolitik. The proponents of  this strategy advocate a close partnership 
with non-European powers such as China, India and others. In 2006, Russia actu-
ally signed a contract with China on the construction of  a gas pipeline, whose 
first stage would be accomplished by 2010. Eventually, the implementation of  the 
whole project may lead to the export of  60–80 billion cubic meters of  natural gas 
from Russia to energy resources eager China. At the beginning of  the 2007 simi-
lar considerable arrangements were made with India. The prospective natural gas 
pipeline alongside a crude oil route towards Asia and plans to develop liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) production would naturally extend Russia’s global economic 
presence and political clout, as well as strengthen its bargaining powers vis-à-vis 
Europe. In the optimistic scenario of  Russia’s “geopolitical revolutions,” this may 
eventually lead to a certain energy dependence of  the West on Russia and eventu-
ally challenge the Western political domination, thereby, contributing to the global 
shift of  power.9
 “Energy Superpower” and Identity Building
The “gas and oil diplomacy” under a more thorough scrutiny, however, does 
not represent an absolutely coherent, thought-out and effective strategy in the 
long term perspective. On occasions, quite the contrary is true. Most obviously, 
Russia’s pressure on Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus clearly was counterproductive 
in foreign policy terms as “price wars” and cutting supplies not only alienated 
those Russia’s neighbours but provided a stimulus for the European countries 
to reconsider their perceptions and policy regarding Russia and consolidate their 
attempts to ensure energy security. It would be difficult to imagine that the Rus-
sian leadership constantly failed to contemplate the reaction of  other countries, 
which has actually complicated Russia’s ambition to maximize its external influ-
ence. This leads to the inference that Russia’s “energy diplomacy” has become 
a “double edge sword” strategy, and has been simultaneously and at least equally 
applied to both external and domestic environments and audiences, and intended 
to advance interests and shape perceptions.
8 Andris Spruds, EU-Russia Energy Dialogue in the Context of  the Prospective Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment, in: Atis Lejins (ed.), The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy toward Russia: the Partnership and Coopera-
tion Agreement as a Test Case (Latvian Institute of  International Affairs), Riga 2006, pp. 80–81.
9 Vladimir Milov, Poymaty zuravlya v temnoy komnate, in: Rossiya v globalnoy politike, No. 6/2006 (November–De-
cember), p. 93; Mikhail Dmitriev, Russia’s Energy Key Strategy, in: Russia in Global Affairs, No. 4/2006 (October–De-
cember), pp. 120–123.
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After the collapse of  the Soviet Union, Russian leadership has been in a perma-
nent search for the state’s ideology and nature of  its mission. Tsarist Russia built 
its legitimacy on the principles of  the autocracy, orthodoxy and pan-Slavism. The 
Soviet Union under the ideology of  communism assumed the role of  the guard-
ian for the working class all around the world. Neither “liberal democracy” nor 
“liberal empire” had been considered for the consolidation of  the post-Soviet 
elites and society. The “third” Russia inherited only the ever present threads of  
authoritarianism and imperialism accompanied in the aftermath of  the collapse 
of  the USSR with national humiliation and economic and political turmoil.10 
Vladimir Putin had clearly grasped the importance of  the lacking idea of  the state, 
and as Fiona Hill has put it, “[he] assumed the presidency in 2000 with a pledge 
to bring stability and order to Russia, and to begin a process of  restoring the 
country to ‘greatness’ by unifying society, stabilizing the economy, and strength-
ening the state.” And what else in Russia’s case can restore more effectively the 
notion of  Russia’s “greatness” and long sought exceptionalism among its soci-
ety if  not the country’s vast energy resources and repeated rhetorical and actual 
manifestations of  the potential for Russia’s “gas and oil diplomacy”?
The Russian leadership increasingly perceives and underlines the nation’s “in-
dispensability” in global economy and pinpoints to its role of  the “great energy 
power.”11 The importance of  the energy potency has been explicitly and vocally 
underlined on various occasions. According to Vladimir Putin, it is necessary to 
effectively exploit these Russia’s advantages both domestically and internationally 
in order to achieve the ambitious goal of  becoming a “leader in the world energy 
market.” The president has stated that, “our country has certain competitive and 
natural advantages as well as the technical opportunities to occupy a more signifi-
cant position in the energy market. We should use these advantages in the inter-
ests of  the entire international community but also keep in mind our own nation-
al interests. Russia’s well-being in the present and the future directly depends on 
the place we occupy in the global energy market …”12 At the beginning of  2006, 
a leading Kremlin-backed opinion polling agency, the All Russian Public Opinion 
Research Center, carried out a survey assessing the public stances with respect to 
“Russia as an energy superpower.” A large part of  the respondents indicated that 
energy provides Russia with the means to increase its “global weight.”13 At the 
beginning of  2007, another public survey pinpointed to Russian public inclina-
10 Robert Legvold, The Three Russias: Decline, Revolution and Reconstruction, in Robert Pastor (ed.), A Century’s 
Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World, New York 1999, pp. 139–190.
11 Dmitri Trenin, Postimperskiy proyekt, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 January 2006. 
12 Putin’s address to Russia’s Security Council, 22 December 2005; quoted in Vladimir Milov, Mozhet li Rossiya stat nefty-
anym rayem?, in: Pro et Contra, No. 2–3/2006, 13.
13 The All Russia Public Opinion Research Center, 1 February 2006; <http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/
item/single/2264.html>.
Russia’s  
“Energy Superpower”
1
 
New Faces Conference 2005
tion to the necessity to increase Russia’s international importance. 34% of  the 
respondents wanted Russia to aspire a superpower status similar to that of  the 
USSR, 47% one of  the world’s leading nation’s status and 9% leadership in the 
post-Soviet space.1 Thereby it was not surprising that in February 2006, a close 
associate and aid of  the president Putin, Vladislav Surkov, referred to the term 
of  “energy superpower” (“energeticheskaya sverkhderzhava”) in a speech to the 
Congress of  the United Russia political party.15 Since then, the concept of  “en-
ergy superpower” has been re-introduced into public discourse in an orchestrated 
manner by Russian leading politicians and reiterated on both international and 
domestic stage. This demonstrates that the identity building and formation of  
state image is a deliberate objective rather than a by-product of  the “energy su-
perpower” activities and parlance by the Kremlin. One “third” of  Russia’s leader-
ship has apparently searches for its way of  “manifesting the destiny”, increasing 
domestic credibility and legitimacy and eventually consolidating the society.
In this context, it becomes easier to understand the mixed signals to the Western 
partners and investors and the “flexing of  muscles” vis-à-vis Ukraine, Moldova, 
Belarus and other post-Soviet countries, which had been rather counterproduc-
tive in long-term and pragmatic foreign policy terms. The principle of  the “show 
must go on” in demonstrating Russia’s capacity to both international and, primar-
ily, domestic audiences has apparently motivated the Kremlin to chose assertive 
as well as frequently inconsistent policy stances. The announcements regarding 
developing the giant Shtokman natural gas fields have been indicative of  Rus-
sia behaviour with respect to Western partners. Although Russia needs massive 
financial investments and access to state-of-art technologies to develop this field, 
the Kremlin has suddenly and sharply changed its decisions on potential involve-
ment of  foreign companies and strategic direction of  the fields exports during 
the second part of  2006. Concurrently, the pressure on Belarus at the turn of  
2006/07 indicated that the Kremlin did not shy away from an easily predictable 
aggravation of  relations with a close political and economic ally in the post-Sovi-
et space. The case of  Belarus also further allowed the EU new members, particu-
larly Poland and the Baltics, to demonstrate its Transatlantic partners the validity 
of  their interpretation of  Russia as the country of  assertive and confrontational 
behaviour, which willingly turns energy into a political tool. However, for the 
Russia’s leadership, paradoxically as it may seem, insecurity means security, or in 
other words, a certain confrontation on the international scene allows to position 
itself  both abroad and at home. Hence, the effectiveness in real foreign policy 
terms notwithstanding, the Kremlin, above all, attempts to underline and form 
1 The All Russia Public Opinion Research Center, 24 January 2007; <http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/
item/single/3895.html>.
15 The Brookings Institution, Energy Security Series: The Russian Federation, October 2006, 25.
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the perception that it is Russia that retains the capacity and initiative to select 
partners, timing and terms of  energy cooperation. This is apparently perceived as 
an important contributing element to the notion of  the “energy superpower.” 
Moreover, the “energy superpower” ideas and respective policies have become 
a popular and consolidating element not only because of  its external applica-
tion. “Gas and oil diplomacy” has not only pinpointed the constructed image 
of  Russia’s role and status in the global affairs, it also has underlined Russia’s 
leadership to build a “politically and socially responsible” state. For instance, the 
diversification policy possesses a considerable domestic dimension, too. The 
Kremlin and Gazprom by launching, firstly, the Baltic Pipeline project and more 
recently, the Nord Stream project have demonstrated political, economic and 
social responsibility to the domestic audiences. Russians have enthusiastically sup-
ported an increased “economic and political security” from the countries, which 
in Russia have been perceived as “unreliable nations”. Economically, the project 
has provided opportunities to attract additional domestic and foreign investments 
to Russia, in general, and some of  its regions, in particular. Not surprisingly, the 
authorities of  Russia’s northern regions and especially of  the Leningrad Oblast 
have been among the staunchest advocates of  the diversification policy and infra-
structure construction on their territory. In the case of  the construction of  the 
Nord Stream, the subcontractors participating in the project will have to estab-
lish local subsidiaries and pay taxes to the regional budget of  Leningrad Oblast.16 
Alongside the regional lobbies certain Russia’s economic interest groups are also 
interested in the development of  the project.17 Apparently, the Kremlin’s endea-
vours to build, above all domestically, the image of  an internationally powerful, 
respected and not infrequently feared “energy superpower”, which may ensure 
its “sovereign democracy” and implement socially and political “responsible” and 
popular policies at home and abroad, have achieved some success in contributing 
to the consolidation of  the political elite, large economic grouping, regions and 
society at large.
Concluding Remarks
Russia’s leadership attempts to utilize comparative advantages of  energy riches 
and simultaneously attempts to build a new state identity around the concept and 
behavior of  an “energy superpower” frequently run into contradictions and raise 
questions about Russia’s foreign policy character. These contradictory trends in 
terms of  seeking for energy partnership and advancing assertive announcements 
16 Yekaterina Dranitsyna, Gas Pipeline To Supply Oblast With Taxpayers, in: The St. Petersburg Times, 13 September 
2005.
17 For instance, a major Russian producer of  pipelines, which is a daughter enterprise of  Gazprom, would participate in 
the project.
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and confrontational policy decisions will clearly dominate Russia foreign policy 
in the near term perspective. This stems both from Russia’s strengths and weak-
nesses. Russia is a very vulnerable “energy superpower”. Moreover, it may appear 
even more vulnerable in real terms if  in the longer perspective Russia’s rhetoric 
leads the mutual “danger of  entrapment” as for both Russia and Western democ-
racies Russia’s “energy muscle” may appear much larger than it is in reality. Then, 
not only Russia’s external mission will be consolidated around a rather feeble no-
tion of  being great energy power, but it will be entrapped into a frequently con-
frontational pattern of  relationship with its most reliable and closely interlinked 
partners in the West. This will be counterproductive for the all parties involve, 
above all, Russia. 
Putin has stated in a number of  addresses that Russia must rebuild its power on 
a solid economic base. That merely building a big army is not viable in the long 
term, and it needs to be supported. This could be considered to be a manifesta-
tion of  this stated policy.
Cord Christian Busche, Fritjof von Nordenskjöld, May-Britt Stumbaum (left to right)
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Ukraine: Europeans Beyond Europe
Ivan Poltavets
Foreword
While European Union has already expanded and pushed its borders to new 
geographical locations, a question of  its relationship with the new neighbors in-
creases in importance. What will be the model of  the relationship chosen? What 
should be the intensity of  cooperation? How will the demands of  the EU in 
its “Europeanization” policy in the new neighborhood be matched with the use 
of  incentives and leverages? These are the questions important not only for the 
security of  the EU, but also for the neighbor’s internal development, as coopera-
tion with the EU can become a strong incentive for the national neighbor’s elites 
to follow a quicker path of  democratization and move towards a market economy.
Ukraine, a large European country outside of  the expanding European Union, 
without a clear prospect of  membership, currently faces a difficult period of  
transition. Are there incentives for further democratization of  the country? Is the 
Ukrainian political elite up to the challenges of  domestic and foreign policy? Will 
the EU play a role of  an “attraction pole” for Ukraine in its transition process or 
will Ukraine remain a “front-line” in Russian-European relations or the “shared 
neighborhood”?
There are other potent geopolitical forces besides the EU active in Ukraine. The 
US and Russia, too, are competing for the influence in the country, sometimes 
running with contradictory agendas, further disorienting the country. Could there 
be a set of  strategies of  “less-than-superpower” states in Ukraine that would 
allow harmonized efforts, rather than nullify each other, creating friction in the 
region and making it even harder for Ukraine to move along the path of  democ-
ratization and economic development?
Due to the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has managed at least not to succumb to 
a more authoritarian regime, development of  which we are witnessing in many 
of  the other CIS countries. But the Orange revolution is not an achievement in 
itself, but rather a chance for the country to increase the pace of  its transition, a 
chance that is still to be realized. Will the new relationship with EU foster this 
change? Or will the new mode of  cooperation further isolate Ukraine, locking it 
in continuous oscillation between democracy and authoritarianism with which it 
borders in the West and in the East respectively?
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Ukraine: (B)Locked among the Players
Up to now, Ukraine is bound to formulate its foreign policy rather as a reaction 
to the foreign policies of  the major players in the region. The EU, Russia and the 
US are having more or less clear agendas for the country, which Ukraine is unable 
to influence. Therefore it is rather an object of  other countries’ strategies. Fre-
quently the strategies of  the main international players compete with each other, 
splitting among them the weak Ukrainian elite, creating friction not only between 
the players, but also in the Ukrainian domestic political arena. Let us schemati-
cally evaluate the strategies of  the major players, as they are perceived in Ukraine.
The Strategy of Russia
Russian strategy in Ukraine can be described as the wish to protect the status quo. 
Russia’s elite is unable to compete with the US or the EU in pushing its active 
policy measures through in Ukraine, thus it mainly creates friction and tries to 
block the initiatives that give Ukraine more political or economic independence 
from Russia. One of  the recent examples of  open intrusion into Ukraine’s 
domestic affairs was open support by the Russian president Vladimir Putin of  
Viktor Yanukovich, the presidential candidate who lost the elections and whose 
initial proclamations about election victory triggered the Orange Revolution. 
While trying to secure its strongholds in the “near abroad” Russia continues 
its “colorful” retreat from the region. With this attitude Russia is perceived as 
a “brake” for modernization and democratization of  the neighboring countries. 
Moreover, Moscow’s stance on Ukraine can divide member states of  the EU, 
diminishing the coherence of  the EU foreign policy towards Ukraine.
Russia’s perception of  the countries of  the CIS as its “near abroad” on which it 
has some “right of  influence” for historical reasons is not backed by the physical 
ability to exert this influence, especially in competition with elites of  the other 
strategic players. Unwillingness to review the strategy in the region led Russia 
to find itself  supporting the losing political movements in its neighborhood and 
politicians in the neighborhood, further alienating itself  not only from the win-
ning elites, but also from the population of  the countries. 
This type of  Russian foreign policy towards the “near abroad” cannot stimulate 
national elites to seek more cooperation with Russia, as long as there are no 
signals coming from Russia that an equal partnership is offered. On the contrary, 
authoritarianism being built in Russia, neo-imperial language used to describe the 
goals of  its policies in “near abroad” nullifies the rhetoric of  seemingly seeking 
cooperation with Ukraine, scaring off  even pro-Russian part of  the Ukrainian 
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elite. The recent intrusion of  Russia in Ukrainian presidential elections of  2004, 
the territorial skirmish between Russia and Ukraine over Tuzla island deteriorate 
perception of  Russian policies towards Ukraine among the population, thus mak-
ing it harder for politicians to lead a constructive and cooperative dialogue with 
Russia, since they can be easily accused of  treason of  national interests and of  
Ukrainian independence by their domestic political opponents.
The EU between Hope and Despair
The EU is failing to present a genuinely united vision of  the foreign and security 
policy towards Ukraine so far. Without prospects for membership and only pre-
sented with a vague European Neighborhood Policy the Ukraine feels alienated 
from the EU. ENP for Ukraine cannot answer the expectations of  the Ukrainians 
due to the asymmetry between tangible results for the Ukraine and obligations 
that the Ukraine is to fulfill. Lately EU was increasingly busy with expansion and 
constitutional processes devoting little attention to foreign policy in the region 
(except to the extensive, but rather pointless dialogue with Russia). Also, so far 
Ukraine was included into the extremely heterogeneous pool of  countries, to-
wards which EU tried to formulate a single strategy in foreign relations, which 
also lessened the opportunities for fruitful cooperation.
The EU institutional structure is way too complicated for the Ukrainian elite to 
deal with effectively, while the EU lacks not only the meaningful approach to 
Lunch in the Artillery Hall
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dealing with Ukraine, but also lacks the real instruments to support its political 
moves in the country. Comments and declarations cannot substitute for real proj-
ects involving Ukraine that would render tangible results for the partners.
The USA as a Strategic Player
The USA follows a more active approach in Ukraine, building strong bilateral 
relations and openly trying to fill the vacuum, which exists in the region after 
Russia’s retreat. The US is being less reserved than the EU in voicing its posi-
tions on developments in the country, since it is less afraid of  friction with Russia. 
However, at times the US is perceived as being too pragmatic, caring only for the 
stability in the region and hence for the stability of  the European market. Also, 
its support of  Ukraine is frequently directed at the exclusion of  Russia from 
regional politics, which increases friction in Russian-Ukrainian relations.
A lack of  harmony in the US, the EU and Russia interactions in Ukraine, the in-
ability of  Ukraine to influence the strategies of  these players, make the country 
locked in a reactive mode of  an object of  international relations. This leads not 
only to the inability of  Ukraine to choose among the preferential “vectors” of  
its foreign policy, but also to its inability to benefit from participation in various 
regional blocks.  Ukraine simultaneously pursued ideologically incompatible goals, 
such as membership in WTO and in the Common Economic Space, initiated by 
Russia; membership in NATO and the perspective of  membership in the EU, 
while trying not to make this progress harm its relations with Russia; participating 
in the GUUAM and CIS clubs simultaneously, which lead to not receiving tan-
gible benefits from either organization.
Interplay between Elites
It is also worthwhile to briefly mention the dominant attitudes of  the elites of  
the major players, discussed above. The Russian elite psychologically feels uneasy 
about the EU and the US playing a more active role in Ukraine. It fears facing 
competition from other elites in the area that is considered to be within its sphere 
of  influence historically. This fear creates friction in the relationship with other 
players as well as irritation with Ukraine, which constantly tries to stay out of  
from the Russian sphere of  influence, while not being openly aggressive.
The European political elite, working with Ukraine, can best be described as fa-
tigued with the partner. Again, Ukrainian oscillation, inability to honor its agree-
ments with deeds, low performance of  Ukraine in comparison with other East-
ern European transition states, all of  these factors contribute towards the image 
of  Ukraine as the country of  “vanished hopes”. 
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 Ukraine’s political elite is made to understand by the EU that the country defi-
nitely has less priority than the EU-Russia relationship. The inability of  the EU to 
offer Ukrainians more than just a list of  obligations, not supported with incen-
tives, and the inability of  Russia to formulate a positive offer of  cooperation to 
Ukraine devoid of  clear neo-imperial aspirations, contributes to increased skepti-
cism in Ukraine towards both partners. 
After the Orange Revolution, Ukraine did not receive any serious hint for the re-
view of  relationship with the EU or with the US. If  this review is not happening 
in 2006 it can seriously harm the pro-reform part of  the Ukrainian political elite. 
This in turn may deepen the unwillingness of  the Ukrainian elite to continue the 
reforms “on their own”, thus making the country less stable in the long-term.
For years Ukraine under the presidency of  Leonid Kuchma was using pro-reform, 
pro-European, pro-democratic rhetoric as a counter-balance to the Russian vec-
tor, while not supporting this rhetoric with real changes in policy. This tendency 
has some inertia and, multiplied by the greater skepticism on Ukrainian side, may 
slow down positive developments in the country for years, if  not decades.
Orange Revolution: What has Revolved?
The 2004 Presidential elections in Ukraine and the Orange Revolution, unit-
ing Ukrainians in mass protests against the falsification of  the election results, 
proved that the Ukrainian people are ready to defend democratic values, such as 
freedom of  choice, freedom of  speech, freedom of  political opposition. Ukraine 
received an image boost abroad and shattered its former image as the country of  
“vanished hopes” in terms of  democratic developments. Also, one of  the main 
political achievements of  the revolution is the vastly extending public competi-
tion among political forces in the country, which now can be observed with and 
by the excessively transparent conflicts among the main leaders of  the Orange 
Revolution.
A critical evaluation of  the Orange Revolution is necessary to continue and 
strengthen its achievements both domestically and in relations with the foreign 
partners of  the Ukraine. So, what has changed during the revolution and what 
are the tendencies set by the events of  late 2004 that may influence Ukraine’s 
relationship with its major foreign partners? What seeds did the revolution plant 
concerning Ukraine’s domestic development?
First of  all, it is necessary to note that the change of  ruling elite was only par-
tial. Most of  the heroes of  the revolution were part of  the old team and could 
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not bring drastic changes to the modus operandi of  the Ukrainian system. Sec-
ond, the revolution as well as the previous presidential campaign of  the current 
president Viktor Yushchenko were mostly directed against the Kuchma regime 
and did not contain a well-thought out positive program of  economic and politi-
cal reforms. Third, the proclaimed mottos of  morality and honesty in power are 
superseding the ideal of  the rule of  law, which already creates conflict situations 
and suspicions of  continuing corruption.
These traits are matched against extremely high expectations on behalf  of  the 
population, against the grown social consciousness of  the Ukrainian people. Dis-
illusionment that is bound to occur can put Ukrainian society in another round 
of  apathy towards country’s fate, which was apparent during the years of  the 
Kuchma’s rule. However, the mechanisms of  society influencing the elite are not 
yet fully grown and the heroes of  revolution are feeling safe from the need to ad-
vance reforms. On the contrary, the first government after the revolution showed 
itself  as populist, postponing long-term concerns and catering to the short-term 
needs of  the population with the clear goal to succeed in the parliamentary elec-
tions of  2006. 
Although the first post-revolution government was swift in undertaking some 
long-awaited steps in cancellation of  privileges, free economic zones, which were 
to the detriment of  the equality of  economic agents on the market; the govern-
ment also succumbed to administrative price controls in gasoline and meat mar-
kets, unraveled the process of  privatization review, which seriously harmed not 
only the investment climate in Ukraine, but also raised suspicion in adherence of  
the new elite to the market principles.
Ukraine’s business elite was paralyzed by the privatization process review, which 
was used not only with the goal to correct illegal privatization deals, but also with 
an aim to silence business from voicing critique against economic policies of  
the new government. Also, the so-called “re-privatization” was used by business 
groups to acquire their rivals’ property—hence the process, not controllable by 
the government, was highly destabilizing for the economy.
All these trends came into being under deafening silence of  the international 
community, and if  some concern was voiced at all it was easily ignored by the 
government, since there is no effective leverage, such as conditions on loans, to 
influence the policies within Ukraine. Thus, incentives to strive for long-term 
economic and administrative reforms were absent within the country and were 
not present in the form of  external pressure either.
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The revolution in Ukraine brought about a chance for the country to speed up its 
development, but there is no potent driving force in the country that would stim-
ulate such developments. Therefore, although the vector of  development points 
clearly into the direction of  democratization and market economy, the question 
is the speed and stability of  this process. In this regard, involvement of  Ukraine 
into the international processes could serve as a boost to internal developments.
The EU was active during the Orange Revolution in settling the crises and lead-
ing to a peaceful resolution, while Russia was at best an observer in the process. 
This was one of  the first showcases of  true activism on behalf  of  the EU in 
Ukraine, but will that activism continue? It certainly depends on the perfor-
mance of  the new power in Ukraine, which, surprisingly, in its turn may depend 
on the activism of  the EU. Thus a circle is created when performance depends 
on external incentives, and external incentives depend on performance. Will 
that circle become a vicious one or a virtuous one and who will lead this trans-
formation?
Cooperation with Ukraine: How to Proceed
On the one hand, throughout previous years Ukraine proved to be an unreliable 
partner in international relations with a frequently changing mind and the rheto-
ric was not followed by real policy changes. On the other hand, Ukraine proved 
to preserve the resolve to develop democracy and a market economy, which 
other CIS countries failed to do. While political life in Belarus and Russia seem 
to be much less pluralistic and open in comparison to Ukrainian politics, it is 
possible to claim that in Ukraine there is still more short-term politics than long-
term policy. As for the freedom of  speech and media, freedom of  choice and 
general course for democratization Ukraine also stands out among the leading 
CIS countries.
So, on the one hand, Ukraine’s reputation as of  a reliable partner in international 
relations is not satisfactory, which is partially explained by overblown expec-
tations on behalf  of  the international community of  the pace of  reforms in 
Ukraine. On the other hand, after Orange Revolution and clear authoritarian ten-
dencies in Russia and Belarus, Ukraine becomes the only country in the CIS with 
the potential to become the leader of  democratization processes in the region.
However, as we have seen, without external incentives positive developments in 
the country are far from being stable. Involving Ukraine in international coopera-
tion may serve as by far the most potent determinant of  the speed of  domestic 
transformations.
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What should be the characteristics of  such an international cooperation that 
simultaneously serves several goals, namely not only to improve the security in 
the region, but also to contribute to a faster democratization of  Ukraine, bringing 
stability and predictability to the region? 
Previously we have spoken of  the attitudes of  the elites of  the major internation-
al players as well as of  Ukrainian elite. First, in order to enable large scale-projects 
in the region it is vital that fatigue, fear, friction, skepticism are turned into basic 
trust. Without this transformation all serious multilateral cooperative efforts will 
be undermined from the start. Second, some coordination of  efforts in the coun-
try on behalf  of  the EU, the US and Russia should be present, or at least between 
the EU and the US. Unilateral initiatives risk only bringing more friction into the 
region and might stimulate greater division among the partners. 
Also, while working with Ukraine it is necessary to remember that due to the un-
certainty of  political processes within the country Ukrainian politicians are always 
looking to support those projects that besides long-term benefits are giving them 
short-term dividends. Such a lack of  foresight is almost inbuilt into the political 
system of  Ukraine and cannot be ignored. Therefore, for projects to succeed it 
would be best to take this characteristic into account in the course of  their design.
Projects of  mutually advantageous multilateral cooperation should be preferred in 
the first stage of  building a relationship with Ukraine as opposed to projects bring-
ing benefits to only several of  the players and in the very long run. Also engage-
ment in these projects should not raise concerns with the politicians domestically. 
Therefore, since values cannot be put at the top of  the agenda in cooperation, it 
is more realistic to start with common projects in the fields of  energy, transport 
and environment, slowly moving to higher levels of  cooperation. A lot of  projects 
have already been undertaken in these fields, but they have lacked the scope to 
serve as serious tokens to interdependence, and were of  rather local nature.
Environmental cooperation could be best of  all built around the Kyoto pro-
tocol implementation. Ukraine, according to evaluation of  the EBRD, has the 
best potential for the Joint Implementation (JI) projects in Eastern Europe. JI is 
a Kyoto protocol mechanism where the firm, bound by the limit of  the green 
house gas emissions, finds it cheaper to undertake a joint implementation project 
with a firm from a different country. The project presupposes that the one firm 
invests in the other and achieves a reduction of  green house gas emissions, while 
the host firm, receiving the investment, pays off  with certificates that the investor 
can use to meet its limit of  emissions.
Ukraine: Europeans  
Beyond Europe

 
New Faces Conference 2005
Joint Implementation in Ukraine is cost-effective. However, as of  now, the central 
government is lacking the institutional capacity to deal effectively with JI projects. 
Ukraine, due to economic decline through 1991 to 1999, is well below its coun-
try’s quota proscribed in Kyoto protocol. Therefore Ukraine is also able to sell 
its emission certificates as a country. Greatly positive for all sides would be the 
development of  the separate dialogue with EU devoted to Kyoto protocol and 
emission trading schemes to engage Ukraine into flexible mechanisms of  Kyoto 
protocol and also to see that Ukraine spends the money received for the emission 
certificates traded at the national level for the environmental projects. 
In the energy field the opportunities for cooperation stem from several premises. 
Energy consumption in Europe is bound to grow throughout the next decade. 
Russia is interested in securing its place in the liberalizing European gas market. 
Ukraine is interested in securing its transit-country status. As of  now, Ukraine 
transports about 80% of  Russian gas exports to Europe and in the nearest future 
it will remain an important transit route despite the transit route diversification 
efforts by Russia. Ukrainian gas transit system not only requires investments to 
operate safely through the coming years, but also can relatively cheaply be up-
graded to transport higher volumes of  gas. However, the only precluding factor 
to the development of  the Ukrainian gas transit capacity seems to be lack of  trust 
between the players. In this regard, it is possible to run multilateral investment 
projects to increase energy efficiency of  the gas transit system, which could also 
qualify under the Kyoto protocol flexible mechanisms.
Also Ukraine is the 6th largest consumer of  natural gas in the world and one 
of  the least energy-efficient countries in Europe. With the prices for energy 
resources growing, with the wish of  Russia to adapt energy deliveries to the 
Ukraine to world market level prices, it is very likely that energy constraint will 
become a drag on the development of  Ukrainian economy in the medium term 
future. If  the pressure of  the rising energy prices will not lead to a drastic shock 
for the Ukrainian economy it will play the role of  an external stimulus for struc-
tural reforms in the country, for investment into lesser energy-intensive industry. 
These concerns will soon be high on the agenda of  Ukrainian policy makers and 
will be easily catching their eye. This opens a window of  opportunity not only 
for numerous cooperative efforts, but also for saving depleting natural resources, 
demand for which is steadily growing in Europe.
These are just a few examples of  cooperative initiatives that could bring tangible 
results for all parties, improve the basic trust and spread common work standards 
to allow for upgrading the cooperation. These projects can pave the way towards 
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the talks on policies, values and other joint initiatives. Should the dialogue not 
include projects with tangible results it is likely that the dialogue between the EU 
and Ukraine will evolve into the sphere of  rhetoric and will further isolate or 
even disillusion the pro-European part of  the country. 
Among other opportunities for motivating Ukraine to move forward with re-
forms could be simplification of  EU visa requirements, which have always been 
highly bureaucratized and humiliating. Also the EU could grant access for Ukrai-
nian youth to participate in European education and exchange programs. 
Conclusions
In the aftermath of  the Orange Revolution, expansion of  the EU, Ukraine and 
the EU are bound to look for the relationship of  a new quality.
Ukraine is still locked in the reactive mode in its foreign policy due to its inability 
to effectively influence policies of  the main players in the country. Heterogene-
ity in the region increases as Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are following differ-
ent tracks of  development, with Ukraine choosing more democratic approach. 
Further development of  Ukraine along the path of  transition towards democracy 
and market economy currently depends on presence of  external incentives or 
shocks.
In this regard, it would be beneficial for all major players in the region to look for 
multilateral initiatives that bring tangible benefits to the partners and de-empha-
size value differences in order to break from the relationship of  friction, skepti-
cism and fatigue to one based on basic trust. Intensive cooperation in transport, 
environmental and energy domains looks like the best option towards this end.
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NATO’s Support for the AU Mission in the Sudan:  
A Case Study of NATO’s Transformation
Alexia Mikhos
In April 1949, the Treaty of  Washington brought into being a common security 
system based on a partnership among the member states in the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization (NATO).1 This decision marked the determination of  
NATO’s members to create an organization that would be based on security 
guarantees and mutual commitments between Europe and North America. For 
Europe, the transatlantic link enabled protection from the Soviet Union as well 
as from one another. For the United States, it allowed it to have a say in Europe’s 
evolution.
To that end, the Alliance would perform a number of  fundamental security tasks. 
First, it would aim to provide the foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security 
environment, based on the growth of  democratic institutions and commitment 
to the peaceful resolution of  disputes. Second, NATO would serve as a key 
transatlantic forum for consultations and coordination between its Allies on any 
matters that affect their vital interests. Third, the Alliance would seek to deter 
and defend against any threat of  aggression against any NATO member state. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure the security and stability of  the Euro-Atlantic 
area, NATO would be ready to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to 
engage actively in crisis management, as well as to promote wide-ranging partner-
ship, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.
Since the creation of  the Alliance in 1949, the international security environment 
has been transformed in a major way. One such important change was the end of  
the Cold War era in 1989-91. It was at that time that many observers thought that 
NATO would dissolve. However, such expectations were based on a misunder-
standing of  NATO’s structure and objective. NATO was a permanent framework 
for transatlantic security cooperation that had proven its worth independently 
of  the threat that it was originally meant to counter. Furthermore, NATO was 
needed as a framework to help manage the major transitions that Europe was 
undergoing after the end of  the Cold War.
Crisis on the Balkans
With the break-up of  Yugoslavia, NATO faced a further unparalleled challenge, 
which was to bring peace and stability to the Balkans. Throughout the Cold War, 
1 The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent those of  NATO.
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NATO had been focused on collective defense. Security was viewed as tanta-
mount to protecting the national territories of  Alliance members. Thus, the Allies 
did not acknowledge straight away the fact that the Balkan conflicts, albeit not 
directly threatening NATO territory, were nevertheless a security challenge that 
warranted a response from the Alliance.
Thus, with the Balkan crisis came the need for effective crisis management and 
peacekeeping. These represented new areas for NATO. However, NATO rose to 
the challenge, in part through the intensified consultation process, which allowed 
the Allies to be kept informed of  the rapid changes on the ground and to pro-
vide continuous political guidance. NATO’s military structures similarly demon-
strated an astonishing flexibility to adapt to new missions.
Soon after peace was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation in 
Kosovo exploded. If  Belgrade were to be made to alter its policies and to allow 
for a NATO-led peacekeeping force to enter Kosovo, NATO would need to take 
action. To that end, NATO launched an air campaign against Belgrade.
Through its peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, 
NATO acquired great experience in crisis management; in particular it learnt that 
early diplomatic intervention, supported by credible military options, can prevent 
conflict. In early 2001, NATO applied this lesson with much success during the 
civil war in the Former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia.
Thus, the post-Cold War period of  the 1990s saw NATO successfully adapt to 
the challenges of  pan-European crisis management. In line with a changing secu-
rity environment, NATO became Europe’s pre-eminent peacekeeper.
World Trade Center Attacked
The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 
brought about the end of  the post-Cold war period and the dawn of  an era of  
greater and globalized instability. Terrorism became more international and far 
more lethal than before. Maybe not more lethal but a new form of  non-nation-
alistic terrorism that is an ideology based upon religion. Moreover, the spread of  
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons became another defining trait of  the 
international environment. Rhetorically at least, but as Iraq proved …
Once again, NATO would need to transform in order to respond effectively to 
new and unprecedented dangers. Within 24 hours of  the attacks on the United 
States, NATO invoked Article 5 of  the Washington Treaty—for the first time 
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in its history—indicating that this attack on the United States was perceived as 
an attack against all Allies. By agreeing that a terrorist attack by a non-state actor 
should trigger NATO’s collective self-defense obligation, the Alliance, in effect, 
mandated itself  to make combating terrorism an enduring NATO mission. 
This broadening of  the meaning of  collective self-defense was complemented 
by a second precedent soon after. In Prague, in November 2002, Allies extended 
NATO’s geographical reach to “out-of-area”, by mandating NATO forces to go 
wherever they are required, and to defend against threats from wherever they 
might come. Thus, in the face of  global threats, NATO’s defense was no longer 
artificially constrained by outdated geographic limits imposed during the Cold 
War.
In that context, in mid-April 2003, NATO decided to assume the lead role in the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the international peacekeeping 
mission in Afghanistan, by taking on the command, co-ordination and planning 
of  the operation. NATO’s enhanced role aimed to reinforce the international 
community’s commitment to building a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan.
NATO’s role in Iraq
Shortly after the ISAF decision, NATO’s role was to be further transformed 
and widened following the start of  consultations on a possible NATO role in 
Magnus Christiansson and Stephen Fox (left to right)
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Iraq, which began in 2002.  The campaign against Iraq in March 2003 was con-
ducted by a coalition of  forces from different countries, led by the USA. NATO 
as an organization had no role in the decision to undertake the campaign or in 
its conduct. However, in response to a request by Turkey in February 2003 for 
assistance under Article 4 of  the North Atlantic Treaty, the Alliance undertook 
a number of  precautionary defensive measures to ensure Turkey’s security in the 
event of  a potential threat to its territory or population. In June 2003, the Al-
liance also agreed to support Poland, a member of  NATO, in its leadership of  
a sector in the multinational stabilization force in Iraq, including through force 
generation, communication, logistics and movements.
With NATO’s assistance to Turkey and its support to Poland, NATO did not 
require to have any permanent presence in Iraq; rather, NATO’s involvement in 
both aforementioned cases reflected the Alliance’s commitment to the security of  
its member states and policy of  making its assets and experience available wher-
ever and whenever they are needed.
NATO’s role in Iraq was to further evolve following the letter sent by the interim 
Iraqi Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi to the NATO Secretary General on 22 June 
2004, requesting NATO support to his government through training and other 
forms of  technical assistance. In that context, on 28 June 2004, at their Summit 
meeting in Istanbul, NATO Heads of  State and Government agreed to help Iraq 
build the capability of  its Government to address the security needs of  the Iraqi 
people in line with the request by the aforementioned Iraqi Interim Government 
and in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546. A 
Training Implementation Mission was hence established on 30 July 2004. It was 
later re-named NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). The guiding principle of  
this NATO mission is that it is the Iraqis, who make the decisions and are in the 
driving seat. NATO is there only in their support.
On the Black Continent
NATO’s necessary evolution and transformation in the ever-changing security 
environment continued when on 8 June 2005, NATO took a landmark decision 
and agreed to undertake its first mission on the African continent, specifically 
to provide logistical support to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS).  
Indeed, when the African Union (AU) took the decision to expand significantly 
its peacekeeping mission in Darfur to about 7,700 troops in an attempt to halt 
the continuing violence in the region, it realized that AMIS could not succeed 
without substantial international effort.
NATO’s Support for Darfur
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Logistical support for the Darfur operation
As a result, on 26 April 2005, in a letter by AU Commission President, Mr. Alpha 
Oumar Konaré, asked NATO to consider the possibility of  providing logistical 
support to its operation in Darfur. On 17 May, Mr. Konaré visited NATO, pro-
viding details on the kind of  assistance that the AU would require in this regard. 
This was the first visit by an AU official to NATO.  On 26 May, NATO Secre-
tary-General attended the Major Donors’ Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
where he expressed NATO’s readiness to help the AU mission in Darfur with 
logistics and to assist the AU with training. Based on further clarification and 
confirmation of  the AU’s requirements, as well as consultations with the AU, the 
European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC)—the Alliance’s principal decision-making body—agreed on 8 June on the 
detailed modalities and extended Alliance support to the AMIS. 
Thus, NATO agreed to support the AMIS first, by coordinating the airlift of  AU 
troops into the region. At the beginning of  August 2005, the AU requested that 
NATO also assist in the transportation of  civilian police staff. Thus, on 5 August, 
NATO agreed to further extend its assistance to the AU in the area of  strategic 
airlift to include the coordination of  the transportation of  civilian police personnel.
The EU was also to provide airlift assistance, and hence NATO would work in 
close coordination and constant consultation with the EU in this regard. The 
co-ordination of  NATO’s airlift was to be done from Europe. A special AU air 
movement cell was also set up at the AU’s Headquarters in Addis Ababa to co-
ordinate the movement of  incoming troops and civilian police personnel on the 
ground in Africa with the presence of  both NATO and EU staff.
During the first phase of  NATO support to AMIS, which was completed at the 
end of  October 2005, NATO coordinated the airlift of  almost 5,000 African 
Union peacekeepers (seven battalions), significantly boosting the force on the 
ground. NATO also coordinated the airlift of  50 civilian police personnel.
As part of  its assistance in Darfur and in addition to the coordination of  airlift 
missions, NATO provided staff  capacity building workshops for the AU’s officers 
at the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) Headquarters in Addis Ababa and at 
the Force Headquarters (FHQ) in El Fasher, Sudan. The first part of  the training 
in Addis Ababa took place during the period 1–12 August 2005 with 10 partici-
pants. The training focused on strategic level planning to include staff  tactics, 
techniques and procedures that the AU could employ to address the challenges 
presented by Darfur. The second part of  the workshops, conducted in El Fasher 
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during the period 4–23 September 2005, involved 114 participants. They targeted 
the AU Force Headquarters with three identical 5-day course packages covering 
such topics as peace support operations, operational planning and media relations.
In a separate activity, NATO further helped organize an UN-led mapping exer-
cise, which ran between 18 and 27 August 2005. The key purpose of  the exercise 
was to assist AU personnel to understand and operate effectively in the theatre of  
operations, as well as to build their capacity to manage strategic operations.
On 16 September 2005, NATO received a new AU request on further NATO 
logistical support to AMIS. On 30 September 2005, NATO agreed to continue 
to offer support to the African Union for staff  capacity building, as well as in the 
coordination of  strategic airlift during further troop rotations of  AMIS II forces, 
in conjunction with the EU and other donors until 31 March 2006. On 9 No-
vember, the NAC agreed to extend NATO’s coordination of  strategic airlift by 
a further two months until the end of  May 2006, in view of  the schedule of  the 
AU’s troop rotation plan. The coordination of  strategic airlift was implemented 
together with the EU, using the same mechanisms as during the first phase of  
NATO’s support to AMIS in this realm. During this second phase of  NATO’s 
assistance to AMIS, the Alliance coordinated the airlift of  about 5,000 troops in 
and out of  Darfur (six battalions).
With respect to staff  capacity building, NATO workshops for AU personnel took 
place during the period of  5–16 February 2006 in El Fasher and 6–17 February 
2006 in Addis Ababa. The detailed framework for the Staff  Capacity Building in 
El Fasher consisted of  two courses over a two-week period with special emphasis 
on the Joint Operational Centre, reporting procedures, operational planning and 
current operations. Focus was placed on the “Train-the-trainer” concept with an 
invitation to the Sector Headquarters trainers as well. Regarding the DITF Head-
quarters, the training covered topics regarding Strategic Planning over a two-week 
period. 48 students from the Force and Sector Headquarters attended the training 
in El Fasher. 12 students attended the workshops in Addis Ababa.
On 13 April 2006, the NAC took further important decisions regarding NATO’s 
readiness to continue its current support mission to AMIS until 30 September 
2006, covering the coordination of  strategic airlift and capacity-building, subject 
to consultations and agreement with the AU. Moreover, the Council agreed, sub-
ject to consultations and agreement with the AU, to provide further support to 
AMIS to include Joint Operations Centre capacity building, unit pre-deployment 
certification and lessons learned.
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Following the Council decisions, on 2 June 2006, Mr. Konaré sent a letter to 
NATO Secretary General asking for further NATO support for the establish-
ment of  an AMIS Joint Operations Centre, as well as for training assistance in 
the fields of  unit pre-deployment certification and lessons learned.   
On 5 June 2006, the AU also asked all partners for international assistance in 
running a course in the field of  Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegra-
tion.  NATO is considering, in close coordination with all its partners, a possible 
contribution to partners’ training assistance in this field.
On 7 June 2006, the NAC decided to extend NATO’s logistical assistance to 
AMIS until the end of  2006. On 8 June 2006, NATO’s Defense Ministers ex-
pressed their willingness to extend the Alliance’s support to AMIS to assist with 
the establishment of  an AMIS Joint Operations Centre, unit pre-deployment 
certification and lessons learned.
Following a Note Verbale by the AU on 25 August 2006, NATO responded posi-
tively to the request to deploy two personnel in Addis Ababa in order to provide 
temporarily staff  capacity building assistance within the Information Assessment 
Cell of  the DITF. The training started on 11 September 2006. Moreover, follow-
ing an AU request on 19 September 2006, NATO is providing mentoring and 
training to the DITF for an AMIS Lessons Learned Exercise to cover military, 
civilian police and civilian support staff  activities. In this area, NATO is working 
in full complementarity with the European Union, which will also be providing 
substantive input to the process.  
In the latter phase of  NATO support, NATO has coordinated the airlift of  3 AU 
battalions and about 450 civilian police personnel. Meanwhile, on 14 December 
2006, the North Atlantic Council agreed to respond positively to the request of  
the Commission of  the African Union, dated 7 December 2006 for a continua-
tion of  the existing assistance offered by NATO to AMIS until 30 June 2007. In 
this regard, NATO has agreed to continue to offer, within means and capabilities, 
support to the African Union for staff  capacity building, as well as in the coordi-
nation of  strategic air transport in support of  troops and civilian police person-
nel induction and rotation, in conjunction with the European Union and other 
donors.
Key principles of the AU support
The key principles that the AU is in the driving seat guides NATO’s assistance to 
AMIS to solving the conflict in Darfur and the Alliance’s role is in support of  the 
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AU to contribute to strengthen the AU’s capability to meet this challenge.  Indeed, 
NATO is supportive of  the view of  having African solutions to African prob-
lems. NATO’s response is tailored to the appeals and expressed needs of  the AU. 
NATO’s assistance is responsive to the AU’s requests. Moreover, it has been a 
common understanding from the outset that NATO will not send combat troops 
in Darfur; NATO’s assistance relates only to logistic support.
In all its efforts with respect to Darfur, NATO aims to work in full consultation, 
transparency and complementarity with the EU, the UN and all other relevant 
donors. To ensure the maximization of  the involvement of  all international orga-
nizations and actors involved in providing assistance to the AMIS, coordinating 
mechanisms and constant open dialogue at Headquarter, as well as theatre levels, 
have been established. Such structures enable to avoid duplication of  efforts.
In conclusion, NATO’s transformation following the end of  the Cold War has 
been undertaken with great success as demonstrated by the variety of  operations 
and missions which it has undertaken successfully since then. NATO has demon-
strated an astounding capacity to change and to manage change. NATO remains 
a security organization, which plays an essential part of  world order.
With respect in particular to Darfur, NATO has proceeded successfully, driven by 
the requests and needs from the AU. NATO has received positive feedback from 
the AU on its contribution so far to AMIS, which has been perceived as very 
useful and as going some way towards increasing the effectiveness of  AMIS. That 
said, ultimately, in Darfur, however important a peacekeeping operation is for the 
short term, a lasting peace will only come through a successful political process. 
To that end, all parties need to resolve their internal and external divisions and 
commit themselves earnestly to peace.
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NATO Cooperation with Central Asia:  
New Frontier or Fool’s Errand?
James Mackey
At their Summit in Istanbul in June 2004, NATO Heads of  State and Govern-
ment stated their intention to “put special focus on engaging with our Partners 
in the strategically important regions of  the Caucasus and Central Asia.”1 While 
the Allies have for some time discussed the need for greater engagement in these 
two regions, NATO’s programs prior to Istanbul remained fairly limited. Fol-
lowing the “Strategic Shift” at Istanbul, several major changes have taken place 
in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program to make it more relevant to the 
needs and interests of  NATO and these less-developed Partners. However, these 
new initiatives face many of  the same challenges of  past NATO programs in the 
two regions, including lack of  democratization, lack of  political will to under-
take reforms, language and cultural barriers, and lack of  resources. NATO must 
address these challenges or develop innovative ways to work around them if  its 
programs are to achieve any measure of  success.
This paper seeks to address why the “Strategic Shift” to the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia was undertaken at Istanbul (with a specific focus on Central Asia), what 
tools NATO is using to address the security threats faced in these two regions, 
and what the prospects are for success in this endeavor. Finally, I will compare 
NATO’s programs in Central Asia with the many other competing interests of  
the Alliance, and will make the case that NATO’s strategic interests justify the 
increased expenditure of  resources in the region.
Strategic challenges in Central Asia
A listing of  the strategic challenges faced in Central Asia reads like a laundry 
list of  post-9/11 security threats. Violent religious extremism, latent inter-state 
conflict, trafficking in weapons, narcotics, and persons, and weak and non-demo-
cratic state structures all contribute to a region in flux, oftentimes bordering on 
instability. The expansion of  EU and NATO borders eastward only increases the 
likelihood that NATO Allies will have to deal with these challenges on their own 
doorsteps. Of  more immediate concern, the states of  Central Asia border on 
Afghanistan, a country in which NATO and its partners have deployed more than 
35,000 peacekeepers. The security of  the surrounding region has a direct impact 
on the success of  NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. While it would be nice to 
1 The views expressed in this paper are the private views of  the author, and do not represent an official position of  the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
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think that NATO’s assistance to Central Asia is a purely altruistic exercise, such 
a claim would be false. While NATO’s goals may be noble and lofty—promot-
ing democratic reforms and enhancing security for the people in the region—its 
motives are more often grounded in realpolitik—heading off  threats before they 
reach NATO’s borders.
NATO has a three-level approach to promoting security sector reform. At the 
level of  individuals, NATO seeks to promote “intellectual interoperability”. That 
is, NATO seeks to prepare individuals to be able to participate alongside NATO 
military personnel in peacekeeping operations, and more generally, to be active 
participants in a democratically controlled security sector. At the national level, 
NATO seeks to promote democratic institutional reform. This means encourag-
ing reform of  security sector institutions to make them more transparent, ef-
ficient (interoperable with each other), and accountable to parliamentary author-
ity. At the interstate level, NATO seeks to promote regional and international 
cooperation. In addition to preparing states for joint participation in international 
peacekeeping operations, this also means promoting joint approaches to regional 
security issues.
NATO has developed a continuum of  programs to address it interests and those 
of  its Central Asian Partners. NATO and individual NATO Allies run several 
thousand programs a year focusing on defense reform and military interoper-
ability, ranging from language training, to international humanitarian law courses, 
to staff  officer training for participation in a multinational peacekeeping head-
quarters. NATO has developed key sub-sets of  programs to address specific 
security challenges. Two of  the most important are the Partnership Action Plan 
on Terrorism (PAP-T) and the Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution 
Building (PAP-DIB—which is a specific set of  programs dedicated to promoting 
democratic control of  the security sector). NATO headquarters and the Central 
Asian partners engage in an ongoing discussion on which programs will best fit 
the interests of  both NATO and the states concerned. For some states in the 
region, enhancing border security is a top priority. For others, updating Soviet-era 
defense budgeting and accounting systems is a key task. NATO seeks to provide 
advice and assistance on these critical reform processes, as well as help the states 
concerned find the resources necessary to conduct oftentimes expensive reforms.
The way in which NATO and a Partner country structure their cooperation is 
based on the needs, interests, and level of  development of  the country in ques-
tion. All Partners develop an Individual Partnership Plan (IPP) with NATO yearly. 
This is a jointly agreed list of  training activities and military exercises in which a 
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Partner will participate. Partners whose cooperation with NATO is slightly more 
advanced participate in the Planning and Review Process (PARP), in which some 
or all of  their security forces undergo defense review procedures similar to those 
of  NATO Allies themselves. More advanced still is the Individual Partnership 
Action Plan (IPAP), in which a Partner and NATO jointly agree on a detailed 
program of  security sector reform. The benefit to a Partner of  participating in 
more advanced programs is not only a more rapid rate of  defense reform, but 
also greater access to NATO resources and expertise to help them conduct those 
reforms.
 NATO faces many challenges in successfully achieving its defense reform goals 
in Central Asia. Chief  among these is the lack of  democracy and rule of  law in 
most states in the region. While NATO can and does do much to promote these 
values in the states of  the region, this is a long-term and often arduous battle that 
must be fought, as the continued lack of  democratization slows the overall re-
form effort. Even in countries where lack of  democracy is not as much of  a con-
cern, it is difficult to achieve the political will necessary to engage in complicated 
and oftentimes expensive security sector reforms. While some states in the region 
lack monetary resources (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic), all 
states in Central Asia region currently lack the human and institutional resources 
necessary to engage in substantive security sector reform.
Kari Osland, and Dominik Antonowicz (left to right)
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Suspicious Russia
Another significant challenge to the success of  NATO’s mission in Central Asia 
is Russian suspicions of  NATO’s motives and methods. While the NATO-Rus-
sia relationship is growing in scope and substance, Russia remains quite wary of  
NATO activities in Central Asia, and often uses its influence in an attempt to 
limit cooperation between NATO and the states of  Central Asia. If  NATO is 
to achieve its goals in Central Asia, it must figure out ways to assure Russia that 
NATO programs are not a threat, but in fact enhance Russia’s security by increas-
ing stability and security in a region on Russia’s borders.
Despite the significant challenges facing NATO in Central Asia, there are an 
equal number of  factors working in NATO’s favor. Chief  among these is the fact 
that NATO programs address the real security needs of  its Partners. Whether 
it is enhancing border security capabilities or advising states on parliamentary 
oversight of  the defense budget, NATO is attempting to address the most press-
ing security reform concerns of  the states in the region. The fact that NATO 
programs are useful to the states in the region can be seen in the fact that all of  
these countries express a strong desire to increase their cooperation activities 
with NATO. 
Another important factor that enhances NATO’s chances of  success in the 
region is the experience gained in the reform processes of  NATO’s ten newest 
members. Not only has NATO gained a great deal of  experience in the field of  
post-Soviet defense reform, these states are themselves playing an active role in 
sharing their experiences with the states of  Central Asia. Still another important 
factor working in favor of  NATO’s success in the region is broader and deeper 
cooperation with the OSCE, EU, and UN. Each organization has significant as-
sets and experience to bring to the region, and our increased cooperation is yield-
ing benefits to the states of  Central Asia.
Yearning for change
Finally, and most importantly, is the desire of  the people in the region for change 
within their societies. While the human, political, and economic rights situation 
in Central Asia is still quite poor, the ordinary citizens of  Central Asia are begin-
ning to agitate for improvements in their government structures and their daily 
lives, including in the security sphere. As the events in Andijan in April 2005 and 
the continuing low-level violence during protests in The Kyrgyz Republic have 
showed, the political opening of  Central Asia will be quite difficult and at times 
violent. But the people of  Central Asia are showing unmistakable signs that they 
want greater accountability and transparency in their governments. NATO, and 
NATO Cooperation with 
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
 
New Faces Conference 2005
other important international security actors like the EU, UN, and OSCE, can 
play an important role in encouraging, cajoling, and sometimes browbeating the 
governments of  Central Asia into moving in the right direction.
NATO certainly does not have all of  the answers to the complex and rapidly 
evolving security situation on the ground in Central Asia. True change, if  it is 
to come, must be demanded by and led by the people of  the region themselves. 
However, NATO has many useful tools for security reform that have proven 
themselves time and again over the past decade in Central and Eastern Europe. 
With further adaptation to the unique cultural and political circumstances of  the 
region, they can be just as useful for promoting democratic security sector re-
form in Central Asia. The process of  reform in Central Asia will not be easy, and 
significant setbacks can be expected along the way. But given the stakes involved, 
the West has little choice but to continue to promote reforms in this strategically 
important region.
Lina Hedin, and James Mackey
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Clash of Foreign Policies in Central Asia:  
Human Rights vs  Realpolitik
Violetta Yan
The five Republics in Central Asia are, as they appear today, largely creations of  
the Soviet Union. For over 70 years they were forgotten, closed territories to the 
outside world. This point cannot be underestimated, for it was the Soviet Union 
who put in place not only the states, but also the infrastructure on which they 
survive today.
In the last 15 years the people of  the region have been pre-occupied in re-build-
ing their livelihoods in the harsh re-adjustment period following the collapse of  
the Soviet Union. In the closed world of  Soviet Central Asia this collapse was 
neither anticipated nor embraced, and this partly accounts for why the post-So-
viet era has been overseen by the former Communist Chairmen. Glasnost or 
Perestroika never found prevalence in Central Asia as it did in European Russia 
or the Baltic States. Today’s Presidents are manifestations of  the late Brezhnev 
era of  cadre politics, building large entourages and, if  anything, accentuating 
the trends that caused the implosion of  Communism in other regions in order 
to cement their reigns. In doing this they have mercilessly exploited the natural 
resources to be found in the region, including oil, gas, coal and gold.
It is these resources that have spurned a phenomenon amongst political scien-
tists known as the “Great Game”, a twenty first century re-incarnation of  the 
nineteenth century confrontation for imperial power and prestige between Russia 
and Britain. This “Great Game” though is markedly different. Prestige has been 
replaced by the want to exploit Central Asia’s natural resources. In addition to 
this, “new” security threats such as religious terrorism and trafficking in narcotics, 
human beings and weapons mean that global actors must engage in the region in 
order to protect their interests. The economic face to the new “Great Game” has 
raised the stakes to a higher level, and as such, significantly increased the number 
of  actors. Russia, the incumbent politico-economic power in the region remains, 
but is now challenged by the United States (US), the European Union (EU), Tur-
key, Iran, India and China, to greater or lesser extents.
Political scientists and strategists tend to look upon the Great Game from the 
outside. Their focus is on which power can gain what, and ultimately, which out-
side power will establish a dominant political and economic position. Few people 
have looked inwards at the Great Game. The important issues for the man on the 
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street in Bishkek are not whether a unipolar or multipolar world order exists, but 
rather who offers the best opportunities for long term political, economic and 
social stability and development.
This article will attempt to take a look at the Great Game from a perspective of  
how the different actors are trying to achieve influence in the region, and which 
approaches offers the best prospects for the development and stability of  Central 
Asia.
Objectives in the new “Great Game”
To understand the different approaches used by the various competitors in the 
Great Game it is necessary to first define their objective. The objective for all 
the competitors is to create an environment, which best serves, their economic 
and national security interests. Kazakhstan is said to have the estimated proven 
and probable oil reserves at approximately 26 billion barrels,1 whilst Turkmeni-
stan’s reserves in natural gas are said to be 30% of  all world reserves.2 Until the 
mid-1990s Central Asia remained less attractive for natural resource companies 
due to the lack of  supply infrastructure and the high costs of  exploration and 
exploitation. However, as the demand for oil and gas has dramatically increased, 
especially from China and Western Europe, and the desire of  the USA to expand 
its oil supply options has increased, so Central Asia has become a prime natural 
resources market. By the late 1990’s oil companies from Russia, Europe, America 
and, lately, China have been both colluding and competing for a share of  Central 
Asia’s natural resources.
National security concerns are also behind the “Great Game”. Even before the 
events of  September 11th 2001 in America the region had become known as 
a breeding ground and outpost for religious extremists. The high birth rate, in 
Uzbekistan at 26.22 births per 1,000 population,3 coupled with the low socio-
economic conditions provided a perfect breeding ground for disenfranchised 
young men who could be easily persuaded that they had been failed by both 
Communism and Capitalism. This manifested itself  in some of  the armed militia 
during the Tajik Civil War between 1993-1997 and later by the rise of  the Islamic 
Movement of  Uzbekistan (IMU) based in the Ferghana Valley city of  Naman-
gan. The region’s proximity to Afghanistan, its porous borders and ineffective 
law enforcement structures also presented the possibility that religious terrorists, 
or the weapons they needed could both emanate and transit through the region 
1  <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook> (22/9/2005).
2  <http://lenta.ru/articles/2005/04/07/turkmen> (21/9/2005).
3  <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook> (22/9/2005).
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and into Russia, China and Europe. Outside powers used the events of  Septem-
ber 11th 2001 to add to their economic presence in the region by engaging with 
the Republics to clamp down on religious extremism and terrorism in the region. 
America, Russia, China and several European countries stepped up their security 
cooperation with Central Asian states after 2001. This included military assistance 
and law enforcement training. In addition to bilateral assistance, both Russia and 
China have created or enhanced existing security structures to fight the perceived 
threat of  terrorism in the region. These include the establishment of  the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure in early 2004.
The approaches of  the competitors in the “Great Game” are, in many respects, 
molded to the characteristics of  the five Central Asian Republics. The five Cen-
tral Asian republics started their evolution as sovereign actors in international re-
lations after the collapse of  Soviet Union in 1991. They immediately and publicly 
allied themselves with developed democracies and firmly committed themselves 
to human rights. It was never going to be that easy though. At first they found 
themselves unknown, not exiting geopolitically on international maps. Mean-
ingless lines on the Soviet maps now became firm borders, which was an alien 
concept in the minds of  millions of  Central Asians. These new Republics faced a 
multitude of  problems that prior to 1991 were never considered, such as disput-
able borders, enclaves and divided nations.
Violetta Yan
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Moscow’s agenda, which had been dominating for 70 years, disappeared over-
night and left a vacuum. Newly independent Russia, under Boris Yeltsin, was it-
self  turning to the West for guidance. In the early days of  independence, the Cen-
tral Asian Republics still looked up to its “older brother” in Moscow for the lead. 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan made similar 
commitments and joined the same organizations together with Russia and other 
former Soviet Republics. Their membership in the United Nations was just a pro-
cedural issue as was their simultaneous accession to the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1992. The new Constitutions of  all the 
Republics declared democracies and guaranteed human rights unconditionally. 
Furthermore, these states signed most of  human rights treaties quickly and main-
ly without any reservations. The political process, at that time, was seen through 
the lenses democracy and human rights as paramount concepts. It helped to gain 
international recognition. In addition, democracy and human rights were quickly 
realized as productive in terms of  aid and investments from the West. 
Not too fond of democracy
As the Presidents’ of  the Central Asian Republics became more comfortable and 
confident in their roles, the lack of  genuine commitment to human rights and 
democracy revealed itself. Indeed, it is indicative that no election in any of  the 
countries in the region has been recognized as free and fair in the last 15 years by 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). As we stand 
here today, in 2005, it is fair to say that neither civil society, political pluralism nor 
basic political liberties has really taken root in any of  the countries, possibly with 
the exception of  Kyrgyzstan.
Disappointing Kyrgyzstan
The greatest disappointment in the region was the regression of  Kyrgyzstan. 
After gaining independence, Kyrgyzstan was termed the “island of  democracy”, 
distinguished by rapid economic and political reforms in the spirit of  free market 
and human rights. It acceded to the World Trade Organization in 1998 and still 
remains its only Central Asian member. President Askar Akaev was the most pro-
active and promising leader. Kyrgyzstan’s status as a relatively poor, landlocked 
country was the key impetus for this strategy. Despite some gold reserves, the 
country does not possess the natural energy reserves to be found in Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan. It has therefore had to rely on good will and foreign 
assistance in its development.
4 All the five Central Asian republics together with Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Ukraine joined the CSCE on 30/1/1992.
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However, starting from 2000, actions of  President Akaev shattered the illusion of  
Kyrgyzstan as an “island of  democracy” in a repressive region. Political plural-
ism began to be infringed upon as oppositional leaders were prosecuted. Daniyar 
Usenov (then a leader of  the People’s Party) was found guilty of  criminal charges 
dating back to 1996. As a result, he was constitutionally ineligible to stand in the 
2000 Presidential election. Felix Kulov (Chairman of  Ar-Namys party, a former 
Mayor of  Bishkek, former Governor of  Chui Oblast and former Minister of  
National Security) was banned from the same Presidential election race and sub-
sequently imprisoned on the grounds of  fraud and embezzlement. During “Aksy 
Events” civil resistance in support of  the opposition Member of  Parliament, Az-
imbek Beknazarov, quickly escalated into civil unrest. During the clashes between 
the law enforcement bodies and supporters of  Azimbek Beknazarov on 17-18 
March 2003 in the Aksy district of  the Jalalabat province six people were killed 
by police gunfire. This human rights’ reverse wave, which lasted until the end of  
2004, could have been stopped by the “revolution” that took place in March 2005. 
However, the supporters of  the revolution, a fragmented group of  criminal/busi-
nessmen, opposition politicians and supporters of  further democratic freedoms, 
hinted that despite the outward appearance of  a popular revolution unseating 
an authoritarian leader, the post-revolution reality was going to be a lot different. 
And so it has turned out to be. The expectations of  those hoping for further de-
mocracy have not materialized, and criminal elements that supported the revolu-
tion now control all key state functions and economic interests.
Rich Kazakhstan
In contrast, Kazakhstan was always in the most enviable situation in the region. A 
small population of  15 million occupies a territory of  2.7 million square metres 
rich in oil, gas and coal reserves. Kazakhstan has 29 billion barrels of  proven oil 
reserves and 1.8 trillion cubic metres of  proven natural gas reserves. These have 
spurred per capita GDP to 7800 Dollar in 2004. Despite this, Kazakhstan re-
mains somewhat of  a kleptocracy. In 2003 it emerged that President Nazarbayev 
and a former Oil Minister had received more than 78 million Dollar in kickbacks 
from oil companies in exchange for lucrative oil contracts. In the same year, it 
was uncovered that a Swiss bank account held more than 10 billion Dollar in Ka-
zakh state funds. These funds had never been disclosed to Parliament or in any 
budget documents, so it was with some incredulity that Nazarbayev announced 
shortly after the disclosure that the money was Kazakh oil revenues being held 
back in a “state development fund”. What happens to this fund should the Naz-
arbayev family someday stop ruling Kazakhstan will be interesting.
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Given this relative economic wellbeing, Kazakhstan has never been a beacon for 
democracy or human rights in the region. Political pluralism has never fully taken 
root in the country. Prominent opposition figures such as Bolat Abilov, a promi-
nent member of  the opposition bloc “For a Just Kazakhstan” have consistently 
been barred from standing for election after sudden prosecutions. This practice 
went as far as to imprison the former Prime Minister, Galiymzhan Zhakiyanov, in 
2002 after he had established the opposition party, “Democratic Choice of  Ka-
zakhstan”. Persecution of  independent media and journalists, especially through 
the use of  criminal libel laws has decimated free press in the country. In the 
Central Asian context, freedoms are rather compromised than brutally violated 
if  compared with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. For instance, whilst the use of  
exhaustive legal and administrative obstacles has hindered the development of  
political pluralism, there have been no reported cases of  torture in Kazakhstan 
recently.
Civil war in Tadjikistan
The situation in Tajikistan stands out among all others, as it was the only country 
in the region to descend into civil war. Between 1992–1997 the Civil War in the 
country caused 100,000 casualties and displaced 500,000 people. The peace agree-
ment, brokered in 1998, was designed to form the basis for democratic develop-
ment. However, 2003–2005 have been characterized by a clamp down on opposi-
tion politicians, including those party to the peace accords, and a sustained attack 
by President Rakhmonov’s government on independent media sources. The 
backsliding on democratic development achieved in the late 1990s has once again 
led Tajikistan to the brink of  instability. This threat has been accentuated by the 
lack of  economic development and widespread poverty still afflicting the majority 
of  the population. GDP per capita income was just 1,100.5 It remains the poorest 
region in Central Asia, despite some recent Russian, Pakistani and Iranian invest-
ment in hydroelectric projects in the country.
Personality cult in Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan stands out in the region as the most repressive regime in a region 
where democracy and human rights were already weak concepts. Already from 
1993, Human Rights Watch started highlighting the oppression of  all civil and 
political rights in the country, criminal persecution of  political dissents and the 
widespread use of  torture. Human Rights Watch reported that the continued 
widespread use of  torture made “Turkmenistan the only Soviet successor state 
known to continue this barbaric practice”.6 To compare it to the closed, repres-
5 <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook> (22/9/2005)
6  <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/WR97/HELSINKI-18.htm> (8/9/2005).
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sive regimes of  North Korea and Burma would not be unrealistic. The final blow 
to political opposition in the country came in 2002, when President Saparmurad 
Niyazov alleged that he had been a target of  an abortive assassination attempt. 
In the aftermath, prominent government ministers, former ministers and those 
in positions of  power in the country were purged, put on trial and imprisoned. 
These included Boris Shikmuradov, the former Chairman of  the Central Bank, 
Batyr Berdiyev, former Foreign Minister, and 58 others. In addition, 4 former 
officials, including the Minister of  Agriculture and the former Turkmen Ambas-
sador to Turkey were tried in absentia, whilst another 58 people (including 21 
members of  the same family) were held without charge. Of  the 58 people im-
prisoned, it is not clear how many are still alive. It has been well documented that 
President Niyazov has build up a cult of  personality. Posters of  him adorn build-
ings in very town and village in the country. The book he wrote, the “Rukhnama”, 
has replaced academic texts and has been given an equal status to the Koran. The 
plentiful natural gas resources to be found in the country have fuelled this egotis-
tical behavior. In 2004 Turkmenistan had 1.43 trillion cubic metres of  natural gas 
reserves. Despite the potential for wealth, the population lives in abject poverty, 
with both education and health care cut back to a minimum in the last two years.
Stagnating Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan became a state of  concern in the region some time later. Criticized 
for failing to reform its economy, the country has stagnated around an autocratic 
political system backed by ownership of  the key economic resources by seven 
or eight of  the most powerful families in the country. Since the mid-1990s, both 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations have criticized 
Uzbekistan for its use of  torture and poor prison facilities. Harsh government 
policies were adopted in the mid-1990s to curb the perceived threat of  Islamic 
extremism in the country, particularly in the densely populated but economically 
depressed Ferghana Valley region. Non-state sponsored mosques were banned, as 
were beards. These policies, coupled with the strangulation at birth of  moderate 
opposition parties such as “Erk” and “Birlik” have, if  anything, led to genuine 
opposition to the Karimov regime being forced underground and becoming 
radicalized. The “fight against terrorism” has used to be justified by combating 
terrorism and religious extremism. The Uzbek population, seeing that the current 
regime offered no prospects or chances for economic development, have turned 
to other authorities for help. This is illustrated by the growth of  Islamic extrem-
ist groups as an alternative to the governmental authority. The IMU, who in the 
late 1990s controlled large areas of  the Uzbek city of  Namangan, and according 
to residents introduced social welfare provision, education and law and order, is 
one such example. They gained certain public support due to repressions, deep-
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ening economic crises, restrictions on trade in local markets (bazaars), draconian 
measures in border security. Members of  Hizb ut-Tahrir claimed some 4,000 of  
their co-religionists had been arrested since late 1998, the majority in 1999. Hu-
man Rights Watch and other rights groups documented the conviction of  several 
hundred members of  the group in 2000 for engaging in unsanctioned meetings, 
teaching religion and praying in private, and possession and distribution of  litera-
ture not cleared by state censors.7 Worryingly, at Easter and in June 2004 Uzbeki-
stan experienced a wave of  suicide bombings, the first such attacks in the region.
“Cultural obstacles” for democracy
All the incumbent elites, to varying extents, refer to cultural obstacles while 
justifying their repression of  human rights and democratic development. In fact, 
cultural factors are more articulated by the elites themselves than exist in real-
ity. They foster the opinion that human rights and democracy are western values 
not appropriate to the local societies (at least) for the present historic moment. 
President Nazarbayev has stated this in two addresses to the nation in the year 
2005 alone. Furthermore, the leadership in these countries keep the people un-
aware of  the essence of  human rights (for instance, the majority of  Uzbek and 
Turkmen population lacks access to Internet and use of  it is restricted). Based 
on the afore-mentioned it can be disclosed that the state policy on human rights, 
its failures and perspectives are mainly dependent on the ruling elites. Therefore, 
their democratization or replacement will have a direct impact on human rights 
and people’s lives in the region.
On May 13/14, 2005 the Uzbek authorities crushed an anti-government protest 
in the Ferghana Valley city of  Andijon. The Uzbek government stated that 187 
Islamic terrorists had been killed. Reports by some international organizations 
and NGOs, including the OSCE, United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees and Human Rights Watch suggested that the figure could actually be be-
tween 500–1000, and include women and children.
Through this event two approaches were discernible, the “Realpolitik” approach, 
adopted by Russia and China, and the “Human rights”-based approach, used by 
the European states and the US. Generally, although all the states in the Great 
Game in Central Asia have their own objectives, whether based on national se-
curity considerations or economic desires, European states and the US appeal to 
certain standards, while Russia and China operate purely in a realpolitik manner.
7 <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook> (22/9/2005).
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A “Realpolitik” approach does not care about human rights and international law. 
From this perspective, their own interests, exercising power in pursuit of  relative 
gains, drive states as the main actors. Military strength is the apparent principle. 
Russia’s and China’s reliance on their military might and resisting any external 
military presence in the region discloses this approach. They perceive the US 
military bases as a direct threat to their interests in the region and, therefore, ac-
tively lobby for the withdrawal of  the American Forces from Central Asia. At the 
same time, they increase their military capabilities in order to alter the balance of  
power. There is a gradual activating of  military capabilities of  the region under-
way with joint military training being put in place.
Hard-nosed approach from China and Russia
Russia and China build up their relations in the region on a leader-to-leader con-
tacts basis. These two big players recognize the incumbent presidents as indi-
vidual decision-makers. They consider stability in the region as a stability of  the 
ruling regimes and disregard populations and civic institutions. Therefore, Russia 
and China consider any potential for change of  the regimes/elites as a security 
challenge and are interested in their status quo. Uzbekistan’s interpretation of  
Andijon events, for instance, was regarded as adequate and these two big players 
have accepted the Uzbek government’s reaction as rational. The Chinese foreign 
ministry spokesman clearly stated that Beijing was “delighted” the situation was 
again under control.9
Furthermore, being heavily criticized for alarming situations in human rights 
inland, the leadership of  China and Russia find it comfortable to strengthen their 
presence in the region without such idealistic conditionalities as human right ob-
servance. They mainly view the spread of  human rights norms in the region as a 
part of  the enforcing strategy of  the US and Europe to dominate. Therefore, any 
effort to improve their own or Central Asian records on human rights is judged 
as interference in domestic affairs. Moreover, they counterbalance such efforts. 
While, for instance, the European countries and the US repeatedly warn about 
fraud elections in the Central Asian republics, China and Russia recognize these 
elections fair and transparent.
Ambivalent USA and liberal EU
It should not be forgotten that the US position is ambivalent in Central Asia. 
Many human rights and democratization experts heavily criticize it for foreign 
policy towards Uzbekistan and previous support of  President Karimov at the ex-
8 Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations, Washington, DC, 1999, pp. 57–62
9 Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising, International Crisis Group, in: Asia Briefing, N° 38, 25/5/2005, p. 7, < http://
www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3469&l=1>.
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pense of  human rights. Indeed, tension between morality and self-interest in US 
foreign policy is evident about consequences of  giving up in human rights, too.
Human rights-based interpretations stem from liberal theory of  International Re-
lations and are diametrically opposite to realpolitik. It regards rights and freedoms 
of  every human being rather than powers of  governments. Nations, attaching 
themselves to this approach, are expected to respect certain international norms 
on human rights and to carry out their international policy through observance 
of  human rights. The US and European countries tend to follow this path; they 
emphasize the rights of  ordinary people. Consequently, in case of  Andijon events, 
the US and especially European Union stood against Uzbek leadership’s closing 
the case and called for international investigation.
Security is differently viewed through the “human rights” and the “realpolitik” 
lens. The first one is more comprehensive and includes human dimension and 
human rights issues in particular. It reasonably concerns about deficit of  democ-
racy and poor situation in human rights as about security threats in general and 
roots of  extremism in particular. Contrarily, in realpolitik perspective security is 
mainly achieved through stability of  regimes and powers. There is no space for 
deeper understanding of  social processes.
The bigger players’ approaches do not progress towards needs of  peoples of  
Central Asia. China and Russia continue dealing with the Central Asian countries 
in the realpolitik manner. The US is closing down its human rights programs 
throughout the region, although still making general references to human rights 
(for instance, blocking the Kazakhstan’s chairmanship in the OSCE). The EU 
seems to preserve its former policy and remains the most committed to its initial 
course toward human rights ideas. However, there are less and less demands 
which could have helped the republics to step up to a higher standards in human 
rights. Kyrgyzstan is fatigued by strikes and demonstrations and has got stuck in 
constitutional reform. President Rakhmanov is re-elected in Tajikistan and this is 
not promising for human rights development in the country. Turkmenistan is pre-
paring to elect a new president after the death of  President Niyazov, but it is most 
likely that the current elite will keep power. Uzbekistan remains self-isolated and 
closed to criticism from abroad. Although trying to improve its human rights im-
age hastily in order to get chairmanship in the OSCE, Kazakhstan in fact remains 
a country where political system hampers human rights. The Central Asian ruling 
elites learn lessons how to manage internal protests of  their populations and 
resort to realpolitik strategies while the populations are left with ever less solid 
international support and with less enthusiasm about human rights perspectives.
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It would be naive to call for states to abandon their interests in the region. How-
ever, if  realpolitik is viewed as rejecting human rights dimension, it will inevitably 
undermine stability in the region since it does not address the needs of  the popu-
lations as roots of  security and development challenges in Central Asia. Similarly, 
if  “human rights” approach remains rhetoric or even gets withdrawn, conditions 
for instability and extremism are even more favored in Central Asia.
To be responsible, the international community has to rescue discredited hu-
man rights and democratic values in the region from external rivalry and for the 
sake of  long-term comprehensive security. The big players should foresee the 
consequences of  short-term zero-sum policies and re-approach current foreign 
policies towards taking into account security challenges and needs of  Central 
Asian societies. In the context of  lasting grievances within these societies, the 
latter is necessary but not sufficient given the detachment of  human rights issues 
from international politics in the region. This also could help enlarge possibilities 
Anders Hellner, Dominik Antonowicz, and Magnus Christiansson (left to right)
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for constructive and “win-win” strategies for all the players in Central Asia and 
provide alternatives to the deepening social and security crises in this region of  
potentials and possibilities.
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Strategic Ambiguity and Domestic Politics:  
US Policy over the Taiwan Issue
Guo Yongjun
A Powder Keg
In the post-Cold War era, there are still many potential powder kegs in different 
regions of  the world. Among them is the Taiwan Strait that poses the biggest 
threat to regional and international security. The danger lies in the possibility of  
war between the existing superpower in the world, the US, and the rising power 
with the biggest population in the world, the People’s Republic of  China (PRC). 
In March 1996, PRC launched missiles into waters very close to Taiwan’s north-
ern and southern tips. In response, President Clinton dispatched two aircraft car-
rier battle groups to that area. Peace and security in East Asia were at “the brink 
of  the precipice.”1
Strategic Ambiguity: Framework of US Policy
Taiwan issue is an internal problem for China. In the civil war right after World 
War II, the Kuomingtang Party (KMT) was defeated by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and retreated to Taiwan island in 1949. However, in the Cold War 
context, the hostility across the Taiwan Strait was linked to international politics, 
and the US committed itself  to defending Taiwan. When the Korean War broke 
out in 1950, President Truman deployed the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait. 
Later, President Eisenhower administration signed the Mutual Defense Treaty 
with Taiwan in 1954.
US policy toward Taiwan could be divided into two phases. In 1950s and 1960s, 
US recognized Taiwan diplomatically and had no official relations with PRC. 
Since President Richard Nixon’s historical visit to PRC in 1972, US gradually 
altered its policy. Within one decade, four founding documents were released one 
after another and set up the framework of  US policy over the Taiwan issue. They 
were the Shanghai Communique (February 1972); the Normalization Communi-
que to establish diplomatic relations between US and PRC (December 1978); the 
1 Alan D. Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of  the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and US-PRC Relations 
(Henry L. Stimson Center), Washington, DC, 2003, p. 176. Kenneth Lieberthal, former Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs and Senior Director of  Asia on the Staff  of  the National Security Council, called 
such war a “tragic”. China scholar Wang Jisi called it a “nightmare”. See Lieberthal, Preventing a War Over Taiwan, in: 
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005, pp. 53–63; Wang Jisi, China’s Search for Stability with America, in: Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 2005, pp. 39–47.
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Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, March 1979); the “8·17” Communique on arms sales 
(August 1982).2
The above documents adjusted US policy substantially. Politically, US shifted its 
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In the Normalization Communi-
que, US “recognized the Government of  the People’s Republic of  China as the 
sole legal Government of  China”. This was the turning point of  US policy and 
US–PRC–Taiwan triangle.3 Militarily, US altered its security relationship with Tai-
wan significantly. The Mutual Defense Treaty was replaced by the newly passed 
TRA, which was only an unilateral act and had no binding force. US also with-
drew all of  its military personnel and facilities from Taiwan.
However, the US also decided to maintain “cultural, commercial, and other unof-
ficial relations” with Taiwan. The phrase “other unofficial” could cover a very 
broad field, including arms sales. Thus US tried to maintain a delicate balance 
between the rivals divided by the Taiwan Strait. Over a number of  politically and 
substantively difficult issues that had to be tackled, the US used so many unclear 
words in the above founding documents. It made certain promises and compro-
mises to both PRC and Taiwan, the majority of  which were declared in passive, 
inactive tone. The word most often used was “not”. Thus US policy over Tai-
wan issue has been termed as a “strategic ambiguity”. With such dual ambiguity, 
Washington has gained advantage over the other two players in the US-PRC-Tai-
wan triangle.
The legal status of  Taiwan is of  critical importance. Does the island have its own 
sovereignty? If  not, to whom does its sovereignty belong? What is the relationship 
between the island and PRC? From a legal perspective, this is the first question to 
answer when the Taiwan issue is under discussion. Beijing holds that PRC is the 
sole legal government of  China, Taiwan is one part of  China and its sovereignty 
belongs to the PRC. All US administrations since 1972 have stated “on China” as 
the cornerstone of  their policy, but have refused to clearly recognize PRC sov-
ereignty over Taiwan. In the Shanghai Communique, US “does not challenge [italics 
2 For the original text of  these documents, see CRS Report for Congress RL30341—China/Taiwan: Evolution of  the 
“One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, Updated September 7, 2006, p. 32, pp. 
36–38, pp. 41–42.
3 Taiwan is one part of  PRC, so it is not accurate to equal them and use the term “US-PRC-Taiwan triangle”. The more 
accurate term should be “US- China Mainland-Taiwan triangle”. In this paper, the author adopts the term “US-PRC-
Taiwan triangle” just for convenience to discuss.
4 Richard Pious, who studied the constitution, read the TRA thoroughly and reached the conclusion that US “has no 
real commitment to the security of  Taiwan … What it has … is a process by which the United States may recognize 
and act upon its own security interest. That is all the Taiwan Relations Act requires.” See: The Taiwan Relations Act: 
the Constitutional and Legal Context, in: Louis W Keoing (ed.), Congress, the Presidency, and the Taiwan Relations 
Act, New York, 1985, p. 161.
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added] that position (of  PRC)”. Such words have left a strong impression that US 
was very reluctant to make such statement. In the Normalization Communique, 
US “recognizes the Government of  the People’s Republic of  China as the sole le-
gal Government of  China”, but only “acknowledges the Chinese position [italics added] 
that there is one China and Taiwan is part of  China”. Remember, “acknowledge” 
is different from “recognize”. After the “8·17” Communique, the Department of  
State answered questions submitted by the Senate and said clearly: US took no posi-
tion [italics added] on Taiwan’s sovereignty; that was a matter to be resolved by the 
two sides of  the Strait.5 Just as Allan Romberg pointed out, “beyond ‘acknowledg-
ing’ the Chinese position that there is ‘one China’ of  which Taiwan is a part, it [US 
‘One China’ policy] largely consists of  things that the United States will not do.”6
Another substantial issue is the US security relationship with Taiwan. This has 
been the most sensitive and most difficult part of  the triangle. Taiwan hoped 
that the US could continue to be burdened with defense obligations: the more, 
the better; the longer, the better. This issue was defined mainly through the TRA 
and the “8·17” Communique, responding to Taiwan and PRC respectively. Both 
documents contained subtle words and left much room for US interpretation.
Firstly, to what extent would US commit itself  to defend Taiwan after the ter-
mination of  the Mutual Defense Treaty? In the TRA, US considered that “any 
effort to determine the future of  Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including 
by boycotts or embargoes, is a threat to the peace and security of  the Western 
Pacific area and of  grave concern to the United States”, so it would “maintain the 
capacity of  the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of  coer-
cion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of  the 
people on Taiwan”. Once such a danger emerged, “the president and the Con-
gress shall determine … appropriate action” [italics added] in response. Here at least 
three questions arose. (1) What did “grave concern” mean? Was this the kind 
of  “concern” to famine in Africa, Middle East peace process, Central America 
conflict, or terrorism attack against US homeland? (2) Would US use the “capac-
ity” maintained? If  yes, then when? Under what kind of  circumstances? (3) What 
kinds of  actions would be covered by the term “appropriate action” in case of  
PRC attack against Taiwan? Did it include direct US military involvement? To all 
these questions, there was no answer in the founding documents.
Secondly, what was the future of  US arms sales to Taiwan? PRC wished US set a 
deadline to terminate such transfers. In the “8·17” Communique, US stated “that 
5 Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: US-Taiwan Relations since 1942, New York, 2004, p. 174.
6 Romberg (fn. 1), p. 225.
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it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of  arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms 
sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the 
level of  those supplied in recent years since the establishment of  diplomatic rela-
tions between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually 
its sales of  arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of  time to a final resolution [italics 
added].” Here again, we see too many “not”. The US again took a passive, inac-
tive tone to response to PRC’s requirement. “Gradually”, “long time”, and “a 
period of  time” were all indefinite. It could be months, decades, or even longer. 
Also what did “final resolution” mean? PRC interpreted it as the end of  arms 
sales, while US referred to the resolution of  the Taiwan issue.7
US strategy ambiguity was best reflected in the so-called “six assurances” promise 
to Taiwan. Right before the “8·17” Communique, the Reagan Administration 
pledged to Taiwan that it had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales; had 
not agreed to hold prior consultations with PRC on arms sales; had not agreed 
to revise the TRA; had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; 
would not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; would not exert 
pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC. Here we see that all 
substantive issues in the US-PRC-Taiwan triangle were included and fitted into 
Romberg’s statement on the US’s “one China”. Such strategic ambiguity unavoid-
ably sowed seeds for future troubles in US-PRC-Taiwan relations. In the long run, 
US policy framework is still in dilemma and many factors could have an impact 
upon it.
Impacts from Domestic Politics
Domestic politics represents one of  the most important factors, which impact 
US strategic ambiguity now and then and poses US policy and Strait security as 
being uncertain.
In the US, domestic politics has had a lasting impact on foreign policy. Con-
gress, interest groups, and lobbyists play an important, sometime critical role in 
the president’s decision in foreign affairs. Sino-US relations are one of  the most 
important bilateral relations in US foreign policy, and always rise as a subject of  
heated debate during election years. Taiwan, the well-known powder keg in East 
Asia, has always been the most sensitive issue, comparing to trade, human rights 
and other issues in Sino-US bilateral relations. Such a trend is intensified by Tai-
7 Zi Zhongyun, US Foreign Policy after World War II: from Truman to Reagan, Beijing, 1994, pp. 916–924.
8 CRS Report for Congress RL30341—China/Taiwan: Evolution of  the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from 
Washington, Beijing, and Taipei (fn. 2), pp. 40–41.
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wan’s lobbying activities in Washington. Sales of  F-16 fighter aircraft and former 
Taiwanese “president” Lee Teng-hui’s American trip were two typical cases.
In September 1992, President George H. W. Bush (Bush I) announced that his 
administration had decided to sell 150 F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan. This was 
an obvious violation of  the “8·17” Communique. Since the Communique was re-
leased, US had limited its arms sales to Taiwan. The value of  arms sales was $ 525 
million in 1982, $707 million in 1984, and $479 million in 1991. But the value of  
150 F-16 fighter aircraft reached $5.8 billion, more than the total of  the sales dur-
ing 190s.9 This decision went beyond the framework of  “strategic ambiguity”, 
and the reason lay in electoral politics. President Bush I experienced the negotia-
tion of  the “8·17” Communique (as vice president that time) and understood the 
crucial significance of  this sale. He was also a strong supporter of  stable Sino-US 
relations. But at this moment, he was campaigning for re-election. The manufac-
turer of  F-16, General Dynamics, is located in Texas, which has 32 electoral votes. 
To get a contract from Taiwan and save jobs for workers, the company pushed 
Congress to lift the restrictions in the “8·17” Communique. Led by two Con-
gressmen from Texas, 100 Congressmen (almost one fourth of  the total) wrote 
to Bush I and urged him to permit this deal. Senator Lloyd Bentsen from Texas 
argued that “hard-working Texas defense workers don’t deserve to be penalized 
just because the (Bush I Administration) insists on coddling Communist lead-
ers in Beijing.”10 Under such pressure, Bush I finally made the decision. He won 
Texas, but Sino-US relations were harmed. In the White Paper on Taiwan issued 
in 1993, PRC declared: “This action of  the US Government has added a new 
stumbling block in the way of  the development of  Sino-US relations and settle-
ment of  the Taiwan question.”11
More serious and substantial harm was done to Sino-US relationship in the case 
of  Lee Teng-hui’s visit to his alma mater, Cornell University. Here Congress again 
exerted strong pressure upon the executive branch. In the founding documents, 
the US promised that its relationship with Taiwan would be restricted within “un-
official” level. According to the 1994 review on Taiwan policy made by Clinton 
administration, Taiwan’s “president”, “vice president”, “premier”, ”vice premier” 
would be allowed to make low-profile transit stops in US, but visits to the US 
were forbidden. Just as Richard Bush said, in the existing framework, “a public 
visit to the United States by Taiwan’s top official—even in a private capacity—ar-
9 Don Oberdorfer, 1982 Arms Policy with China, Victim of  Bush Campaign, Texas Lobbying, in: Washington Post, 
September 4, 1992.
10 Bentsen Urges OK of  F-16 Jet Fighter Sales to Taiwan, in: Los Angeles Times, August 23, 1992.
11 The State Council Information Office of  PRC, The Taiwan Question and the Reunifications of  China, Beijing, August 
1993. For another white paper issued by the Office, see: The “One China” Principle and Taiwan Issue, February 2000.
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guably stretched the meaning of  ‘official’ to the breaking point”.12 When Lee’s 
case was raised, State officials had intended to decline Taiwan’s application. They 
considered that granting visa to Lee “would remove one of  the most important 
elements which makes the relationship unofficial … reversing commitments at 
the highest level of  the US government over many administrations.”13 However, 
the lobbying firm Cassidy & Associates, whose main customer was Taiwan, was 
successful in lobbying the Hill. In February 1995, the Asia and Pacific Affairs 
Subcommittee of  House Committee on International Relations held special hear-
ing on the issue of  Lee’s visa. All members attended and each wanted to speak on 
this subject and argue why Clinton administration should grant a visa to Lee. This 
hearing was “one of  the most sophisticated operations to influence foreign policy 
in recent memory.”1 Later both House and Senate passed resolutions urging the 
president to grant visa to Lee, and threatened to pass binding legislations to force 
the president to allow Lee’s entry. Under such Congressional pressure, Clinton ad-
ministration shifted its policy and granted visa to Lee. This time, PRC’s response 
went far beyond protesting words. The ambassador to the US was recalled and 
the Defense Minister postponed his scheduled visit to Washington.
During the administration of  George W. Bush (Bush II), a new element appeared. 
This time, it was Taiwan’s domestic politics that kept challenging US strategic am-
biguity policy. The “presidential” election in 2000 was an earthquake in Taiwan. 
KMT, who ruled the island for decades without interruption, was defeated by pro-
independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and native Chen Shui-bian 
came to power. Chen opposed reunification strongly and longed for Taiwan’s 
de jure independence. He availed himself  of  every possible opportunity to push 
Taiwanese independence. Being a former lawyer, Chen was particularly skilful in 
linking his political goal with elections. Since the second half  of  2002, as the new 
“presidential” election was approaching, Chen took more and more aggressive 
actions toward the existing triangle and US policy framework. Firstly he advanced 
a theory that there is “one country on each side of  the Taiwan Strait.” Then from 
the middle of  2003 on, he appealed to hold a referendum on cross strait relation-
ship simultaneously with the “presidential” election. What’s more, he drafted a 
timetable for new “constitution”. US State officials, both in Washington and Tai-
pei, at various level, expressed their concern, repeated Chen’s “five nos” word by 
word to remind him of  his promise, stated that US oppose either side to change 
the status quo unilaterally.15 On December 9, before visiting PRC Premier Wen 
12 Bush (fn. 5), p. 227.
13 Romberg (fn. 1), p. 161.
1 Bush (fn. 5), p. 227.
15 In his first inaugural address on May 20, 2000, Chen promised “five nos”: as long as PRC did not intend to use force, 
he would not declare independence, not change the national title, not insert the two-state theory into the constitu-
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Jiaobao, President Bush II, who had stated to do “whatever it (American military) 
took to help Taiwan defend herself ” in 2001, said he opposed “comments and 
actions made by the leader of  Taiwan” that indicate that Chen “may be willing to 
make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo.”16 However, Chen insisted 
on his adventure and held the referendum on March 20, 2004 as scheduled. The 
situation during Chen’s second term was very similar. When DPP lost the “Legis-
lative Yuan” election in December 2005 and failed to gain majority, Chen decided 
to break his promises to US and abolish the National Unification Guidelines 
(NUG) and the National Unification Council (NUC). The Bush Administration 
strongly rejected such action and sent a special envoy to Taipei to express grave 
concern before Chen. But Chen announced his decision on February 27, and 
the only effect of  American pressure was that Chen substituted the term “cease” 
for “abolish”, namely the NUG “ceases to apply” and the NUC “ceases to func-
tion”.17 Both the referendum in 2004 and the abolishment of  NUG & NUC were 
highly sensitive topics relating to Taiwan’s sovereignty, on which US has tried to 
keep ambiguous. Chen’s provocative actions, which served his domestic political 
interest, have been challenging the US policy framework. Just as the report issued 
tion, not promote a referendum to change the status quo regarding independence or unification, and not abolish the 
National Unification Guidelines and the National Unification Council.
16 President Bush and Premier Wen Jiaobao Remarks to the Press, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releas-
es/2003/12/20031209-2.html> (12/10/2003). For comprehensive study on the referendum issue and it’s impact 
on US-PRC-Taiwan relations, see: Tao Wenzhao, 2004 Provincial Leader Election in Taiwan and US Policy toward 
Taiwan, in: American Studies Quarterly (Beijing), Winter 2004, pp. 39–58; Cai Zhengxiu, Taiwan’s Referendum and 
Constitution Revision and Bush Administration’s Cross-Strait Policy Adjustment, in: Issues and Studies (Taipei), No. 1, 
January/February 2006, pp. 107–133; Michael D. Swaine, Trouble in Taiwan, in: Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004, pp. 
39–50.
17 The President presides over the National Security Council, <http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.
php4>. For US policy statement, see: Taiwan: US Policy, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/60047.htm> 
(1/30/2006); Taiwan: Senior Taiwan’s Officials Comments on National Unification Council, <http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/ps/2006/62488.htm>, (3/2/2006); Taiwan: Chen Shui-bian’s Statements on Cross-Strait Issues, <http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/67748.htm> (6/8/2006).
Guo Yongjun and Kari Osland
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by the Congress Research Service said: Chen Administration’s “pro-independence 
views conflict with the US policies that support the “status quo” in Taiwan Strait 
and are willing to support Taiwan’s independence”, Taiwan-US relations have 
been plagued by “mistrust between the Bush and Chen Administrations; mixed 
bilateral messages” etc.1 For the US, the “democratic” Taiwan is more and more 
difficult to rein in.
Future Trends
The so-called “strategic ambiguity” is meant to avoid definite US attitudes to-
wards specific cases which may emerge in the US-PRC-Taiwan triangle. Such a 
framework for US policy was invented astutely by a couple of  administrations to 
defend US national interests. However, both US and Taiwan’s domestic politics 
have impacted upon the policy framework significantly. In future, such trends 
will be enforced. In the US, Democrats won the mid-term election in November 
2006, and since controlled both Senate and House. The 110th Congress, domi-
nated by the Democrats for the first time since 1994, will exert more pressure on 
the Republican administration’s foreign policy. In Taiwan, the “Legislative Yuan” 
election will be held at the end of  2007, while the “presidential” election will be 
held in March 20, 2008. For the sake of  his historical legacy, Chen Shui-bian will 
probably take new pro-independence actions. Domestic politics from the US and 
Taiwan will continue to exert an influence, sometimes unpredictable challenges, 
to the “strategy ambiguous” policy framework.
1 CRS Report for Congress RL33684–Taiwan-US Political Relations: New Strains and Changes, October 10, 2006, 
“Summary” page.
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The Strategic Partnership of the European Union and the 
People’s Republic of China:  
Common Challenges—Common Actions?
May-Britt Stumbaum
In the framework of  an ever-closer relationship—expressed in the “strategic 
partnership” as declared in 2003—between the European Union and the People’s 
Republic of  China, cooperation in the field of  security has repeatedly been part 
of  the EU-China agenda. Yet, an implementation of  this part of  the strategic 
partnership is hampered by different interpretations of  shared terminologies and 
rhetoric on the so-called “new security concepts,” and different views on the 
international system, the own desired role and, last but not least, the perceived 
role of  the United States of  America. Cooperation in the security field will hence 
remain fragmented and rather marginal in practice and will be most feasible in 
areas where no “hostile actor” is involved, such as (environmental) disaster man-
agement and coping with pandemics.
Since the declaration of  the strategic partnership on occasion of  the 6th EU–
China summit three years ago, a lot of  resources were invested in order to turn 
the declaration into deeds and to substantiate the demanded strategic partnership. 
Yet, the ambitious goals have not been met and a process of  “sobering up” after 
the Sino-European “honeymoon” has been paving its way on both sides of  the 
strategic partnership. The recently published communication of  the European 
Commission1 sheds light on a not too harmonious marriage and on the manifold 
areas where the two partners still need to do a lot of  work. Three years after the 
declaration of  the strategic partnership, this paper aims to take a closer look on 
the underlying conditions for an ever closer cooperation in the field of  security: 
Do we share the same paradigms? Do we share the same priorities? Do we share 
the same goals?
The paper critically assesses the possibilities, prospects and difficulties of  Sino-
European cooperation in the field of  security. It discusses the signed EU-China 
Strategic Partnership and identifies commonalities and differences between the 
European Union and China in both their respective security concepts and in their 
general paradigms on the international system—and hence their perspectives on 
the role of  the US. This chapter will conclude that although on paper there are 
numerous commonalities and common approaches to international issues and 
1 EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, COM(2006) 631 final.
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problems, the EU and China differ too much in their interpretations of  the de-
fined security concepts, their preferred international system, and their positioning 
towards the US. Given these basic differences, cooperation is likely to be success-
ful in fields such as the environment and pandemics, but will remain very limited 
in security areas such as non-proliferation, the fight against terrorism, conflict 
prevention, and energy security.
The Strategic Partnership—Documents, Aims & Tools
In the business area, strategic partnerships are formed for a limited time period 
to achieve a goal by combining the differing strengths of  the two companies, two 
companies that are based on the same market principles. The Sino-European 
strategic partnership aims at the cooperation between a block of  democratic 
countries, the EU and a single, autocratic state, China. Yet it remains to be seen 
if  the fundamental differences in the political systems per se exclude, limit or do 
not impact at all the implementation of  a genuine strategic partnership. To what 
extent do the countries need to share the same paradigm and hence congruent 
connotations of  key principles to establish and implement a sustainable and last-
ing strategic partnership?
Almost three years have passed since the EU called for the implementation of  
a “strategic partnership” with China in its December 2003 European Security 
Strategy (ESS),2 its first ever comprehensive security strategy paper.3 Following 
the first notion of  China as a strategic partner in the June 2003 draft of  the ESS, 
the European Union referred to China as a strategic partner already in September 
2003, when the EU Council adopted the EU Commission’s paper on EU-China 
relations, entitled “A maturing partnership—shared interests and challenges in 
EU-China relations.”
During the following 6th EU-China summit on 30 October 2003, leaders from 
both sides “stressed their resolve to further expand and deepen China-EU rela-
tions, guided by the two policy papers,5 which promote the development of  an 
2 Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy; Brussels, 12 December 2003; <http://
ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.
3 For a Chinese perspective on EU-China relations see e.g. Huo Zhengde, On the China-EU Strategic Relationship; in: 
International Studies, March 2005; China Institute of  International Studies (CIIS); Yi Wang, La Chine et l’UE: Vers 
une Coopération Stratégique; in: Global Views on the European Union (Chaillot Paper, No. 72, Institute for Security 
Studies – ISS), Paris, November 2004.
4 European Commission, A maturing partnership—shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations, COM(2003) 
533 fin, <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/com_03_533/com_533_en.pdf>.
5 The “two policy papers” refer to the Communication of  the Commission in COM(2003) 533 fin (see above) and the 
People’s Republic of  China’s first ever published policy paper on the EU on 13 October 2003: China’s EU Policy 
Paper <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xos/dqzzywt/t27708.htm>.
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overall strategic partnership between China and the EU.”6 For the first time, the 
summit was upgraded by a concurrent bilateral meeting with the Chinese presi-
dent, Hu Jintao. Both sides expressed their intention to deepen cooperation on 
multilateral issues and global challenges, strengthen economic ties, launch numer-
ous new sectorial dialogues and agreements and pursue their scientific, technical 
and development cooperation.
Over the following three years, great diplomatic resources were invested in the 
implementation of  the EU-China “strategic partnership”, establishing respec-
tively envisaging about 22 “sectorial dialogues”.7 In order to promote and imple-
ment “global”/”effective” multilateralism,” “democracy” and “global peace and 
stability”, the EU Commission co-hosted and co-sponsored a number of  EU-
China conferences, roundtables, workshops and seminars to create momentum in 
the aftermath of  the ambitious declaration, discussing the envisioned EU-China 
“strategic partnership” with academics, analysts, journalists and the general public.
The Strategic Partnership and Cooperation in the Security Field
As this paper deals with the perspectives for a Sino-European strategic partner-
ship in the realm of  security cooperation, it is necessary to outline the different 
perceptions of  the new security environment, the respective definition of  security 
itself  and the particular connotations of  the used terminology. The EU’s foreign 
and security policies are still mainly decided and implemented by the individual 
EU Member States, not by EU institutions. Hence, in this context it becomes 
necessary to also take into account the security concepts and approaches to re-
gional and international security of  the Europe’s so-called “Big Three”: Germany, 
the United Kingdom and France.
Perception of the New Security Environment—Challenges, Opportunities and “Comprehensive 
Security” Concepts
Both papers, the “European Security Strategy” (ESS)9 as well as “China’s Position 
Paper on the New Security Concept” (CPP), start off  by referring to the violence 
of  the two world wars and the conviction that the use of  force alone will not fun-
damentally resolve disputes in the long term. However, already the introductions 
6 Joint Press Statement of  the 6th EU-China Summit, Beijing, 30/10/2003, § 28, <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/exter-
nal_relations/china/summit/jpss_301003.htm>.
7 These sectorial dialogues range from competition policy and education & culture to energy and space cooperation. For 
a list of  the EU’s sectorial dialogue, please take a look at <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/china/intro/
sect.htm>.
8 Among other initiatives, the Commission conducted with the EU Member States a follow-up seminar to the 6th EU-
China summit in February 2004 in Beijing in order to draft an Action Plan for implementing the summit declaration’s 
goals. 
9 A Secure Europe In A Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, <http://ue.eu.int/ 
uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.
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illustrate how differently the two parties perceive the situation today: According 
to the CPP, China, having become a power with global political and economic 
influence over the last decade, considers the current international security envi-
ronment to be an opportunity to “discard the old way of  thinking and replace it 
with new concepts and means to seek and safeguard security.”10 Europe, having 
been in a position of  stability, peace and prosperity for the last 50 years, perceives 
the new challenges primarily as threats—hence the ESS emphasizes that “Europe 
still faces security threats and challenges.”11
After September 11th and in response to the spreading impact of  globalization in 
the field of  security, China as well as the European Union and its Member States 
have adjusted and extended their security concepts. During the Cold War, territo-
rial defence against a conventional attack from a sovereign state perceived as the 
primary threat was paramount. This perception has changed to include an ex-
panded security concept which appears to be similar in nature in both parts of  the 
world. Terms for this new concept range from the “New Security Concept”12 to 
“comprehensive security”13 and an “extended security term” (“erweiterter Sicher-
heitsbegriff ”).1 All of  these new concepts emphasise the changing nature of  risks 
and threats in the 21st century, underlining the pre-eminence of  international 
terrorism, the influence of  non-governmental actors and the asymmetrical charac-
ter of  new confrontations. They also include challenges that go far beyond purely 
military concerns, such as demographic shifts, spreading pandemics and securing 
natural resources. Furthermore, they all agree that the challenges of  today are 
global in nature and require concerted responses by the international community. 
In other words, they necessitate extensive international cooperation. The “New 
Security Concept” as laid out by the Chinese government even insists that in this 
“world of  diversity […] security cooperation is not just something for countries 
with similar or identical views and mode of  development, it also includes coopera-
tion between countries whose views and mode of  development differ.”15
In view of  the China’s historical memories of  foreign invasion and occupation 
by foreign troops, defending against foreign invasions and safeguarding territorial 
10 China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept (CPP), Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, Beijing 2003, p. 1 s.
11 ESS (fn. 9), p. 1.
12 See CPP (fn. 10).
13 This term was used for the first time already by the Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira in the 1970s, see i.e. as 
quoted in Raymond Feddema, Akio Igarashi, Kurt Radtke (eds.), Comprehensive Security in Asia: Views from Asia 
and the West on a Changing Security Environment, Leiden 1998.
1 As used by the German Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier in his inaugural speech on 23 November 2005 in Berlin, 
<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2005/051123-SteinmeierAmtsuebernahme.
html>.
15 CPP (fn. 10), p. 2.
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integrity still play the central roles in China’s security concept. Moreover, the em-
phasis on (a peaceful resolution of) territorial and border disputes reveals a world-
view that is dominated by traditional security concerns.16 In Europe, which has 
seen half  a century of  integration and increasing economic, political and security 
interdependence, intra-European military conflicts are now considered highly un-
likely if  not altogether impossible. Threats are “more diverse, less visible and less 
predictable,” as outlined in the December 2003 ESS.17 All of  the Big Three agree 
with this assessment, underlining that “the risks posed by international terrorism 
and the proliferation of  weapons of  mass destruction (WMD) are starker [than 
before], as are the risks to wider security posed by failed or failing states.”1 In 
addition, for Germany traditional territorial defence has lost its significance, and 
international conflicts, asymmetrical threats, terrorism and WMD are now the fo-
cus of  German security interests.19 France points out the increasing vulnerability 
of  societies due to the “spectacular propagation of  information technology” and 
other technologies as well as to the concentration of  populations in vast urban 
societies. France hence adds to this list of  security concerns non-military threats 
such as the possible neutralization of  decision-making centres, possible action 
16 CPP (fn. 10), p. 1.
17 ESS (fn. 9), p. 2.
1 Delivering Security in a Changing World, Defence White Paper, British Ministry of  Defence, December 2003, p. 1.
19 Die Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien, German Ministry of  Defence, Berlin, 21 May 2003.
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against distribution and communication networks, and possible direct actions 
taken to influence public opinion via these new technologies.20
While perceived challenges seem to be of  the same nature in their respective 
security strategies, China and Europe do not necessarily share the same vision 
of  what shape the international system should take. With the European Union 
being built on the ceding of  sovereignty and China still suffering from a trauma 
of  forced foreign influence, both sides differ fundamentally in their views on 
issues such as sovereignty, intervention, so-called “interference in internal affairs 
of  other nations” and global governance. They also face differences in the ap-
proaches towards non-military threats: While the European Union is only slowly 
getting used to the idea of  an “Energy Foreign Policy,”21 China’s rapid economic 
growth and steadily rising demand for energy (above all crude oil) has made 
China prioritize the hunt for energy and raw materials over a broader political 
agenda. Facing criticism for accommodating with dictatorships and autocratic 
regimes for the sake of  securing their supply of  crude oil and other commodities, 
the government typically refers to the principle of  non-interference. Although 
criticism from the EU is still restrained in this context, this example nevertheless 
sheds light on the deviating approaches of  Brussels and Beijing towards global 
governance.
China’s 2003 EU Strategy Paper called for “high-level military exchanges”, a 
“strategic security dialogue mechanism,” training and defence studies coopera-
tion.22 Security issues such as non-proliferation, terrorism, international peace-
keeping, conflict management, the prevention of  people trafficking and illegal 
migration, etc., are now being discussed either within the framework of  the EU’s 
so-called “political dialogue” or in the framework of  the EU-China “sectorial 
dialogues.”
Besides the European Union, many EU Member States, in particular the “Big 
Three”, but also states like Sweden, undertake joint maneuvers, trainings and 
mutual visits of  high-level military personnel on a bilateral basis. The UK and 
France are already holding joint military naval exercises with the Chinese navy on 
a regular basis and Germany has been conducting annual seminars on the level 
of  generals since 2005. In regard to peacekeeping, the EU, being a significant 
contributor to UN peacekeeping operations with its member states’ activities 
20 The 30 Year Prospective Plan: A Summary, French Ministry of  Defence, Paris, 2005, p. 1.
21 See Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Energie-Außenpolitik ist Friedenspolitik, in: Handelsblatt, 23 March 2006, <http://www.
auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/2006/060323-BM-Handelsblatt.html>; Frank Umbach, 
Europe’s Next Cold War, in: Internationale Politik (Transatlantic Edition), No. 3/2006, p. 64–71.
22 However, an implementation of  these measures is hampered by the still existing EU arms embargo towards China.
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combined, has in recent years welcomed and encouraged China’s growing con-
tributions to UN peacekeeping missions.23 Currently, China participates in ten 
UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping is one of  the areas where the EU 
and China could indeed expand their bilateral cooperation to make a visible and 
measurable joint contribution to international security.
The Strategic Partnership and the Limits in Security Cooperation
In order to identify areas for potential cooperation between China and the Eu-
ropean Union in security affairs, it is necessary to identify common aims as well 
as to define what is understood by the used terminology on both sides of  the 
partnership.
Terrorism
In all reviewed concepts terrorism is now at the top of  the list of  threats. Septem-
ber 11 was a world-wide signal that the end of  the Cold War did not stand for the 
“end of  history” as Francis Fukuyama24 predicted at the beginning of  the 1990s, 
but instead released anger, hate and frustration that had been frozen by Cold War 
realities. This resulted in asymmetrical attacks from diverse, decentralised, well-
ressourced terrorist groups that make efficient use of  electronic networks and are 
aiming to cause mass casualties. Focusing on the fact that today’s most prominent 
form of  terrorism is global in scope and linked to violent religious extremism, the 
EU argues that terrorism is a phenomenon arising out of  complex causes, includ-
ing the “pressures of  modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the 
alienation of  young people living in foreign societies.”25 The uneven process of  
globalization, which still excludes the majority of  the global population from the 
benefits of  globalization, is aggravating this trend. The French prospectus points 
out that “as globalization progresses, the disparities in economic development 
and the unequal distribution of  wealth could, if  they become more pronounced, 
increase frustration.” An interpretation of  the most influential countries’ actions 
in issues relating to business, the environment or pollution as hegemonic behav-
ior may result in certain groups adopting a radical form of  protest against market-
based economies and globalization per se. As a result, “these interpretations of  
modernity may lead to violent acts and increase terrorism, especially if  they are 
23 In December 2006, China has been the 13th-largest contributor of  U.N. peacekeepers, providing 1,648 soldiers, police 
officers and military observers to 10 nations, mostly in African countries, including Congo, Liberia and southern 
Sudan. But its activities reach well beyond Africa. Chinese riot police have been sent to Haiti to quell unrest. In 
November 2006, Beijing offered to send 1,000 peacekeepers to southern Lebanon to help enforce a cease-fire between 
Israel and Hezbollah. The United Nations accepted less than half. See Colum Lynch, ‘Beijing expands role as world 
peacekeeper’, in: Mercury News, 14 December 2006, <http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/
world/16237116.htm>. See also the web site of  the EU delegation in Beijing at: <http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/
whatsnew/Solana170304>.
24 Francis Fukuyama‚ The End of  History and the Last Man, New York, NY, 1992.
25 ESS (fn. 9), p. 3.
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based on religious motives.”26 The Europeans perceive this phenomenon as a part 
of  European society, with Europe being both target and base for terrorism. They 
also see a need to consider and address the root causes of  these threats, beyond 
the symptoms and the actual acts of  terrorism.27
The Chinese side shares, albeit to a lesser extent, the European perspective that 
terrorism is a problem caused by economic and social disparity. It hence origi-
nates in less developed parts of  the world, and requires comprehensive policies 
including development aid and what Beijing refers to as the promotion of  “cul-
tural understanding.” Fighting terrorism is one of  the prime goals of  the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization (SCO / “Shanghai 5”28), a regional forum in which 
China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz and Kazakhstan discuss Central 
Asian security issues. The CPP points out that the “”Shanghai 5” has taken the 
lead in making an unequivocal stand and proposition of  combating “terrorism, 
separatism and extremism” by signing “The Shanghai Convention on Combat-
ing Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism” and “The Agreement on regional 
Counter-terrorism Agency.”29 However, the SCO’s international credibility is 
controversial since the SCO’s member states are mainly autocratic regimes with 
still questionable human rights records. The definitions of  who is to be labelled 
a “terrorist” differ between Europe and the People’s Republic of  China.30 Ac-
cordingly, despite both China and the EU having terrorism high on their agendas, 
joint declarations and action plans have not been followed-up with sustainable 
joint actions.
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Along with the threat of  terrorism, the dangers of  proliferation of  weapons of  
mass destruction (WMD) have gained importance for China and the EU. The 
ESS goes as far as to claim that the “proliferation of  weapons of  mass destruc-
tion is potentially the greatest threat”31 to Europe’s security.
The dispersion of  weapons after the dissolution of  the Soviet Union and the in-
creased military potential due to an arms race-like build-up of  military forces, in 
particular in the Middle East and in East Asia, has not only spurred the prolifera-
26 The 30 Year Prospective Plan: A Summary, p. 6.
27 See Delivering Security in a Changing World (fn. 18), p. 4 for the need to address the underlying causes of  these 
threats by working with other Government Departments.
28 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the follow-up organization to the „Shanghai 5“ process launched in 
1996 and includes the People’s Republic of  China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz and Kazakhstan.
29 CPP (fn. 10), p. 3.
30 A matter of  discussion e.g. is the differing perception of  separatist movements of  the Uygur minority in Xinjiang 
province. However, the phenomenon that someone is labelled a terrorist to one actor and a freedom fighter to another 
actor is a general problem in international relations.
31 ESS (fn. 9), p. 3
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tion of  nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons as well as ballistic, 
tactical and cruise missiles and small arms. It has also increased the (legal and 
illegal) transfer of  technical know-how in this area. Hence the French and the 
British concepts label the prevention of  the potential passage of  WMD knowl-
edge or weapons from states to terrorist groups as a key part of  the counter-pro-
liferation challenge.32
In order to stress that the EU considers the prevention of  the proliferation of  
WMDs to be a foreign and security policy priority, it published a strategy paper 
dealing with the proliferation of  WMDs.33 China, too, considers the prevention 
of  the proliferation of  WMD to be one of  the major threats to global peace and 
stability and has issued a specific policy paper on the topic. Beijing and Brussels 
signed a joint declaration on non-proliferation and arms control and an agree-
ment on joint research into the peaceful use of  nuclear energy at the EU-China 
Summit in The Hague in December 2004.34 However, even though Beijing now 
officially commits itself  to actively (with and without the EU) promoting nuclear 
non-proliferation, its track record of  nuclear proliferation, including assistance 
32 See Delivering Security in A Changing World (fn. 18), p. 4, and 30 Years Prospectus: A Summary (fn. 20), p. 6.
33 See EU Strategy Against Proliferation of  Weapons of  Mass Destruction (WMDs), <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms 
Upload/st15708.en03.pdf>.
34 Joint Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, EU-China Summit, December 2004.
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for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme35 and missile technology exports to 
Iran, remain a cause for concern and call into question the probability of  imple-
mentation of  the recent joint declaration with the EU.36 In 2003, the US thrice 
imposed non-proliferation-related sanctions against China for missile-related 
sales. China’s missile technology-related sales to Pakistan and Iran in recent years 
also led the US to veto China’s application for the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) in 2004. Furthermore, Beijing has (unlike the majority of  EU 
Member states) decided not to participate in the 2003 US-initiated Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) arguing that “proliferation issues should be resolved 
within the legal frameworks by political and diplomatic means.” China’s refusal 
to endorse the US-initiated PSI is understandable against the background that 
it was above all North Korea and its proliferation record which triggered of  the 
US initiative. China, North Korea’s solely remaining ally and the biggest foreign 
investor in North Korea, does neither favour a nuclear North Korea nor joining 
in a US-led confrontational course towards Pyongyang. Beijing has yet not signed 
the “International Code of  Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation” which 
is up to date signed by more than 90 countries.
Even if  China does no longer supply states37 with complete ballistic missiles, it 
still provides Pakistan with missile technology which is a “legitimate area for 
study and concern, the more insofar as they represent Chinese strategic support 
for Pakistan’s goals rather than purely commercial motives.”38
The CPP outlines the desire to “conduct effective disarmament and arms control 
with broad participation in line with the principle of  justice, comprehensiveness, 
rationality and balance” and to “uphold the current international arms control 
and disarmament regime.” The phrasing of  this paragraph indicates that China 
remains sceptical about the feasibility of  “fair” conduct of  non-proliferation poli-
cies and regimes. Both sides, the European and the Chinese, lack credibility on 
nuclear disarmament with neither the European nuclear powers (UK and France) 
nor China currently striving to reduce their own nuclear weapons arsenals.
35 See e. g. T. V. Paul, China-Pakistani nuclear/missile tries and balance of  power politics, in: Nonproliferation Review, No. 
2/2003, pp. 21–29.
36 For an excellent analysis of  the issue see e. g. Alyson Bailes, Anna Wetter, EU-China Security Relations: The “Softer 
Side”; Paper presented at International Politics of  EU-China Relations, British Academy and Chinese Academy of  
Social Sciences (CASS), London, April 20–21, 2006.
37 Including Pakistan, according to publicly available information.
38 Bailes/Wetter, ibid. (fn. 36).
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Located in a region where arms expenditures have risen by an average of  22 per 
cent between 1993 and 2002 (compared to 3% world-wide),39 China emphasizes 
that it has no interest in getting involved in an arms race in East Asia and be-
yond.0 However, over the last 15 years China has increased its defence expen-
ditures at a rate of  between 15 and 17% per year,1 with the modernisation of  
the Chinese armed forces spurring the intensifying so-called “security dilemma” 
in Asia.42 In addition, there is a growing consensus amongst analysts, including 
scholars from London’s International Institute for strategic Studies (IISS), that 
China’s “real” or non-official defence budget could be up to two times higher 
than Beijing’s official one. China’s rising military expenditures are a concern 
in the region and beyond, although Beijing argues that more than 30% of  the 
defence budget is being spent on rapidly growing personnel costs. Hence, the 
ever more increasing defence expenditures along with the visible modernisation 
of  China’s armed forces will continue to be closely watched by the US, Japan and 
last but not least Taiwan.
Instabilities, Regional Conflicts and Failing States
The ethnically motivated war in the Balkans in the 1990s was a wake-up call for 
the Europeans. The Kosovo war triggered of  the formulation and implementa-
tion of  the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
Consequently, regional conflicts are at the very heart of  European security con-
cerns as they “destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they 
threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights.”43 Furthermore, as 
pointed out in the British Defence White Paper, these conflicts can trigger mass 
population movements and consequently add to pressures on countries neighbor-
ing the European Union or “emerge as a surge in migration to Europe” itself. 
In the ESS’ view, regional instability can spur extremism, terrorism and state 
failure, provide favorable conditions for organized crime, and fuel demands for 
WMD. These trends can be observed today in the Middle East and on the con-
flict ridden continent of  Africa. Focusing on the proximate areas first, European 
decision-makers are particularly concerned about those states located on NATO’s 
borders and in Africa that are characterized by political mismanagement, eth-
39 Frank Umbach, East Asian Arms Races–and Cooperation; Growth of  weapons heightens tensions, but can spur 
mutual aid, in: Internationale Politik (Transatlantic Edition), Summer 2005, p. 38.
0 CPP (fn. 10), p. 1.
1 Amongst many others see China’s defense budget up 14.7% in 2006, in: China View, Xinhuanet.com, <http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/2006-03/04/content_4256232.htm>, BBC News, China’s military budget jumps 14%, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4773358.stm>.
42 Frank Umbach‚ Strategische Partnerschaft oder multilateraler Kotau? Die EU-China-Beziehungen und die Aufhebung 
des Embargos, in: Internationale Politik, No. 3/2005, pp. 70–77.
43 ESS (fn. 9), p. .
 Delivering Security in a Changing World (fn. 18), p. 5.
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nic and religiously motivated tensions and economic breakdown. As the British 
white paper emphasizes, these states contain areas of  ungoverned territory, which 
might draw neighboring states into competition for control and influence over 
these territories and their resources.45 They can also provide potential havens and 
resources for the support of  terrorist groups and criminal networks involved in 
drug production and trafficking, illegal arms trading or the plundering of  natural 
resources.46 The desire to stabilise these regions in order to avoid having to deal 
with the consequences of  failing states and destabilization has become a cor-
nerstone of  European security policy. The shift from the priority of  territorial de-
fence to meeting challenges where they occur was famously depicted by the then 
German Defence Minister Peter Struck in his comment that “German interests 
are defended at the Hindukush.” Almost all operations in the framework of  the 
European Defence and Security Policy can be viewed in this context.
The Chinese and the European side agree that they are primarily faced with 
intra-state conflicts which destroy infrastructure, encourage criminality, deter 
investment and make normal economic activity—the basis for our well-being—
impossible.47 Coping with instability, failing states and regional conflicts seems 
therefore to be a field favorable for cooperation. Cooperation in this field would 
be particularly beneficial since operations such as stabilization efforts need long 
term, troop-intensive and costly commitments, as illustrated by past experiences. 
Having economic development as its top priority, China, too, depends on a stable 
environment around and within the People’s Republic as well as in the states 
from which it is retrieving its resources. However, considering the two countries’ 
different political systems, and their consequently differing interpretations of  
the sources of  instability, and keeping in mind the fact that most of  the coun-
tries rich in natural resources are also some of  the most problematic areas in the 
world, it yet remains to be seen how meaningful and result-oriented EU-Chinese 
security cooperation in this context will be in the near future.
Organized Crime
Failing states, open borders and demographic pressures favour organized crime. 
For example, 90 percent of  the heroin in Europe originates in poppy fields in 
Afghanistan, where the money is used to sustain private armies, thereby under-
45 A recent example being the military action in Somalia where the different parties are supported by Eritrea and Ethio-
pia, see Äthiopien meldet Tod von bis zu tausend Islamisten in Somalia, 26/12/2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/
ausland/0,1518,456587,00.html>.
46 Delivering Security in a Changing World, p. 5.
47 Also see Chen Bo, Contrast of  the Security Concepts between China and the EU: A PLA Officer’s Perspective, paper 
presented at the conference International Politics of  EU-China relations, London, 20–21 April 2006, p. 12.
 See, for example, Schwere Vorwürfe gegen die ISAF, in: Der Tagesspiegel, 03/12/2006, <http://www.tagesspiegel.
de/politik/nachrichten/afghanistan/83175.asp>.
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mining the democratization efforts and aims of  the European states that operate 
ISAF in Afghanistan. Europe is also a prime target for cross-trafficking of  not 
only drugs and weapons, but also illegal migrants and women: 200,000 of  the 
700,000 women victims of  the sex trade world-wide are smuggled through crimi-
nal networks in the Balkans.9 An additional concern is maritime piracy, which 
causes rising costs by intercepting trade flows. Maritime piracy50—i.e. in the Strait 
of  Malacca—presents an increasing problem,51 as does the spread of  corruption 
due to criminal activities. European-Chinese cooperation could make a valuable 
contribution to combating cross-boarder criminal activities, in a bilateral frame-
work as well as in international initiatives.
Environmental Issues & Pandemics
Apart from those military and policy related issues, the extended security concept 
also encompasses the dangers that arise from a deteriorating environment and 
reoccurring outbreaks of  pandemics. Being less influenced by the differences in 
the political systems and the respective basic values, these areas offer the greatest 
potential for cooperation and have illustrated the most immediate need and also 
the most considerable successes so far. In recent years, pandemics with global 
repercussions such as SARS and the Avian Flu originated in China. Lacking a 
health system capable of  sufficiently responding to these pandemics, China was 
dependent on external help to cope with the situation. Precious time was lost due 
to the PRC’s attempt to treat the disease as a domestic as opposed to an interna-
tional issue. Considering far too long foreign assistance in tackling SARS as “in-
terference” in China’s internal affairs, the Chinese authorities informed the inter-
national community too late about the extent and intensity of  the SARS problem. 
SARS turned out to be a challenge where global cooperation and transparency 
was a necessity in order to stop the world-wide spread of  the disease. Authorities 
did not want to admit failure or put at risk foreign investment, so downplayed 
SARS. Yet, the willingness of  the Chinese government to learn was proven by 
the second outbreak in 2004 that was rapidly—with foreign assistance –brought 
under control.52 The system did prove effective when political will was present.
SARS and the Avian Flu demonstrated that challenges emerging in a distant 
country are nevertheless a security concern for Europe when they reached the 
9 See ESS (fn. 9), p. 3
50 See e. g. Dana Robert Dillon, Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade (The Heritage Foundation, Back-
grounder #1379), June 22, 2000.
51 According to the International Maritime Organization, at least 50,000 ships sail through this strait every year. They 
transport about 30 per cent of  the world’s trade goods and 80 per cent of  Japan’s oil needs. C. S. Kuppuswamy, Straits 
of  Malacca: Security Implications (South Asia Analysis Group), paper no. 1033, <http://www.saag.org/papers11/ 
paper1033.html>.
52 For a chronology of  the SARS epidemic, please take a look at the WHO site on <http://www.who.int/csr/don/ar-
chive/disease/severe_acute_respiratory_syndrome/en/index.html>.
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Old Continent with serious consequences. Environmental concerns also have 
a global impact, as shown by the negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol—which 
neither the US nor China signed. With twenty of  the world’s thirty most pol-
luted cities located in China,53 there is a clear need for the Chinese to cope with 
environmental decline and pollution. Yet, these challenges are not outlined in 
the CPP.54 On the European side, the ESS points to the challenges ahead due to 
poverty and the spread of  HIV/AIDS, both of  which can cause the breakdown 
of  societies. It also emphasizes the increasing migration pressure that will emerge 
from a declining environment. “Competition for natural resources—notably wa-
ter—which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades is likely 
to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.”55
Although these issues are not mentioned in the Chinese paper, they might present 
the areas where the EU and China could indeed (given the political will on both 
sides) co-operate most promisingly in the future.
Securing resources
In order to put its rapidly growing economy on a sustainable path over the next 
few decades,56 China has made securing access to natural resources, including 
raw materials and primarily energy, its first priority. For China, access to natural 
resources as well as foreign markets is essential for its economic growth. The 
People’s Republic relies heavily on securing sea lanes as well as entertaining good 
relationships with states that are exporters of  the desired resources. China has 
extended its economic and diplomatic presence in the most important sea lanes, 
such as the Suez and Panama Canals, and has built up a “string of  pearls” of  
naval bases from South China up to Iran.57 Moreover, China is actively expand-
ing its relations with countries in the Middle East, Africa58 and Latin America to 
ensure a supply of  energy, primarily crude oil. Also the ESS states that “energy 
53 A Swedish Asia Strategy, Government Communication 2005/06:57 (Regeringskansliet Government Offices of  Swe-
den), Stockholm 2006, p. 94.
54 Apart from the general reference that the new security concept’s contents extend „from military and political to eco-
nomic, science and technology, environment, culture and many other areas“; CPP (fn. 10), p. 1.
55 ESS (fn. 9), p. 3.
56 The CPP therefore pays a great deal of  attention on the fostering of  economic exchange in „multi-channel, multi-di-
mensional and multi-faceted new economic cooperation“ and emphasizes the role of  regional economic cooperation 
mechanisms such as the 10+3 cooperation in East Asia; CPP (fn. 10), p. 2. The ESS refers to the economic part of  
security cooperation by referring to the extension of  member of  “key institutions in the international system, such as 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions”; ESS (fn. 9), p. 9.
57 Sudha Ramachandran, China’s pearl loses its luster, 21 January 2006, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/
HA21Df03.html>; Sudha Ramachandran, China’s pearl in Pakistan’s waters, 4 March 2005, <http://www.atimes.
com/atimes/South_Asia/GC04Df06.html>; Bill Gertz, China builds up strategic sea lanes, in: The Washington Times, 
18 January 2005, <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050117-115550-1929r.htm>.
58 From 3–5 November 2006, more than 40 heads of  state and ministers of  45 African countries attended the China-
Africa summit in Beijing. Even the leaders of  the five countries that acknowledge Taiwan were invited as observers, 
but abstained. About 2,500 business deals where under discussion during the three-day-summit. See “Trade to top 
China-Africa summit”, BBC News, 03/11/2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6112360.stm>.
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dependence is a special concern for Europe.” The European Union is the world’s 
largest importer of  energy, with 80 percent of  its energy based on coal, oil and 
gas, as well as the world’s second largest consumer of  energy. Currently, the EU 
imports 50% of  its energy needs. This share is expected to rise to 70% by the 
year 2030, with most energy imports coming from the Gulf, Russia and North 
Africa.59
Yet, it remains questionable to what extent Europe and China will co-operate in 
this area, as they are not only competitors in the quest for energy but also have 
different approaches and policies towards dictatorships in energy-rich countries 
in Africa and the Middle East. Even if  EU policies towards dictatorships in Afri-
ca, the Middle East and elsewhere are not free from contradictions and hypocrisy, 
it has become obvious that China so far puts “business over principles” as far as 
its global energy security policies are concerned.
Finally, even leaving the issue of  democracy aside, there are still fundamental dif-
ferences with regard to the rule of  law,60 the definition and functions of  human 
rights, freedom of  speech and other issues that have remained largely non-ad-
dressed during EU-China meetings and summits61 over the last three years,62 but 
are crucial in building up a genuine strategic partnership.
Different Mind Sets: Multilateralism, global governance and  
the principle of non-interference
In his speech on 6 May 2004, entitled “Vigorously developing comprehensive 
strategic partnership between China and the European Union,”63 prime minis-
ter Wen Jiabao pointed out that “’comprehensive’ […] meant that cooperation 
between both sides is all-round, wide-ranging and multi-level” and that a “part-
nership” requires the cooperation to be based on “equality, mutual benefit and 
win-win result […] on the basis of  mutual respect and mutual trust.” A “strategic” 
partnership hence means that the “bilateral cooperation is of  an overall, long-
term and stable nature, transcends the differences in ideology and social system 
and is free from the interference of  a single event that occurs in a certain period 
59 European Commission, Energy at the G-8 summit: The EC position, Fact Sheet, 15 July 2006, <http://europa.eu/
press_room/presspacks/g820060715/factsheet_g8-energy_en.pdf>.
60 E.g. differences remain between the Chinese concept of  “rule by law” and the Western concept of  “rule of  law”.
61 In the Commissions 2006 Communication, the lack of  results from the human rights dialogue has been—for the first 
time—explicitly pointed out. COM (2006) 631 final, ‘EU-China: closer partners, growing responsibilities’, p. 4.
62 See e. g. Axel Berkofsky, EU-China Relations-Strategic Partners or Partners of  Convenience?, in: Marco Overhaus, 
Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnisch (ed.), German-Chinese Relations: Trade Promotion Plus Something Else? 
(German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Deutsche Aussenpolitik.de, Gateway to German Foreign Policy), No. 16, 23 June 
2005, pp. 14–22; see also Stanley Crossick, Fraser Cameron, Axel Berkofsky, EU-China Relations : Towards a Strategic 
Partnership (European Policy Center, EPC Working Paper), July 2005.
63 See China Daily, 7 May 2004.
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of  time.” While the last remark obviously refers to the Tiananmen Square mas-
sacre, it remains highly questionable to what extent differences in ideology and 
social systems can be “transcended” in order to implement a genuine EU-China 
“strategic partnership.” Ideology is a set of  beliefs, values, and opinions that 
forms the paradigm through which the world and the own country’s situation is 
perceived. When speaking about cooperation in the realm of  security, it is impor-
tant that the actors identify the background against which security strategies have 
been developed, what ultimate goal shall be achieved through this strategy and 
hence to what extent and intensity cooperation could be realistically possible. The 
EU and China have not yet taken these steps.
The Chinese scholar Xinning Song argues that the “EU and China have more 
similar ideas and ways of  thinking” [than compared to the US] as they both 
favour multilateralism and peaceful means of  solving disputes and because they 
do not compete strategically with each other.64 However, the connotations of  
“multilateralism” differ and it remains an open question if  the prioritization of  
multilateralism provides sufficient ground for a strategic partnership. “Favouring 
multilateralism” is a noble concept that on paper the EU has in common with 
many other countries and blocs of  countries as well. It is true that the EU and 
China are not (unlike the US and China) so-called “strategic rivals” or “strategic 
competitors” as George W. Bush suggested at the beginning of  2001. But Brus-
sels and Beijing do not have the same approaches, e. g. towards the use of  military 
force. Whereas Brussels does (so far) exclude the use of  military force to solve 
territorial issues, China does not exclude military means as a way of  solving the 
so-called “Taiwan question.”
Unfortunately, EU policy makers fail to openly point out this fundamental differ-
ence even if  it was outspoken in its stark criticism of  last year’s “Anti-Secession 
Law”, through which Beijing authorizes itself  to invade Taiwan militarily should 
it declare independence.65 Beijing’s preparedness in principle to “re-unify” Taiwan 
with the mainland using military force illustrates a stark contrast between the EU 
and China’s security policy approaches, at least so far.66
64 Xinning Song, EU-China Strategic Partnership: Domestic and International Perspectives, paper presented at the inter-
national conference on International Politics of  EU-China Relations, London 20–21 April 2006.
65 See e. g. Axel Berkofsky, EU-Taiwan Relations should be about more than business; in: Europe’s World, June 2006, 
<http://www.europesworld.org/PDFs/Issue3/ADVERTORIAL_Taiwan.pdf#search=’axel%20berkofskyantisecessio
n%20law>; Berkofsky, U-turn politics on EU-China arms ban; in: The Asia Times Online, March 25, 2005, <http://
www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GC25Ad01.html>.
66 However, this difference in approach, and indeed the cross-strait relations themselves, hardly makes it onto the 
EU-China agenda. Apart from encouraging both Taiwan and China to solve the issue peacefully, the EU does not 
essentially get involved in cross strait relations, leaving the impression that the so-called ‘Taiwan question’ is none of  
Brussels’ business.
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Both the European Union and China perceive themselves as emerging global 
actors that should naturally expand their reach and influence. The ESS speaks of  
the EU as a “more credible and effective actor” that should be ready to “share 
in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.”67 With 
reference to its accumulating power and influence, China also makes its claim as 
an emerging global power. As the scholar Chen Bo puts it, “it is understandable 
that a big country or a big country bloc usually has [a] strong wish to influence 
the world when its comprehensive strength increases. Both the unified EU and [a] 
fast growing China now have new expectations in shaping a new world order. By 
doing so, they will undoubtedly contribute to the change of  forces in the inter-
national system.”68 However, in practice the paradigms shaping the international 
system seen from the EU and China are perceived and defined differently. The 
European and Chinese approaches towards and definitions of  multilateralism, the 
so-called “principle of  non-interference” and the so-called “preventive action” 
differ in their very essence.
Chinese Multilateralism vs. European Multilateralism?
The ESS as well as the CPP emphasise the priority of  “effective multilateralism.” 
On the European side, the “fundamental framework of  international relations 
67 ESS (fn. 9), p. 2.
68 Chen Bo, Contrast of  the Security Concepts between China and the EU (fn. 47), passim.
Anders Hellner
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is the United Nations Charter,”69 while the United Nations Security Council has 
been assigned the primary responsibility for keeping global peace and stability. 
The CPP also underlines that cooperation should be conducted on the basis of  
the UN charter while giving full play to the leading role of  the United Nations. 
However, their interpretations of  multilateralism differ: While the EU wants to 
become a major player in the current international system—including the ac-
ceptance and support of  a “benign hegemon,” the US—and wants to strengthen 
multilateralism, China wants to “promote the democratization of  international re-
lations” and thus aims at reshaping the international system towards a multipolar 
world with the PRC as one of  the major players and “poles” of  power. Judging 
by Chinese political rhetoric of  recent years, it seems that the terms “multilateral-
ism” and “multipolarity” are quasi-synonyms rather than two distinct concepts.70
After initial confusion created by French president Jacques Chirac, who seemed 
to have supported and embraced Chinese rhetoric on the need to create a “mul-
tipolar world,”71 the EU has repeatedly made it clear that it is “multilateralism” 
or “effective multilateralism” and not “multipolarity” it seeks to implement and 
promote.
Albeit using the same term, the EU and China obviously apply different interpre-
tations to the term. Consequently, where and how the EU and China are planning 
to jointly implement multilateral policies has remained largely non-defined so far. 
However, China as a unitary state (like the US and unlike the EU) is an actor that 
naturally prefers bilateralism over multilateralism on a regional and global level, 
avoiding constraints to sovereign action that multilateral agreements bring about, 
while the European Union is a multilateral institution in itself.
Intervention vs. Non-Interference?
European integration is structurally built on the interference in each other’s 
affairs and the willingness to cede sovereignty to a supranational organization. 
China on the other hand emphasizes the principle of  non-interference as one 
(if  not the main) guiding principle of  its regional and global foreign and security 
policies. Foreign advice (critical, “well-meant” or both) e. g. on how to deal with 
the so-called “Taiwan question” or recent criticism on China’s global and contro-
versial policies to secure its energy supply is in Beijing typically being referred to 
and dismissed as “interference” in China’s internal affairs.
69 ESS (fn. 9), p. 9.
70 See Kay Möller, Europe’s Policy: Neither Multipolar Nor Multilateral, in: Gudrun Wacker (ed.), China’s Rise: The 
Return of  Geopolitics (SWP Research Paper 2006/RP 01), Berlin, February 2006, <http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/ 
common/get_document.php?asset_id=3170>,  p. 71.
71 Also see in this aspect the Sino-French Joint Declaration, 16 May 1997, <http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/
chfr0597.htm>.
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In line with determining the UN Charter as the main global reference for inter-
national security policies, the Chinese Position Paper also emphasizes the “Five 
Principles of  Peaceful Coexistence” as the guiding lines for international co-
operation. Co-crafted with India in 1954, the five principles encompass mutual 
respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggres-
sion, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit, and peaceful co-existence. These principles, in particular the first and 
the third, underscore the importance of  national sovereignty and integrity to the 
Chinese. However, they are in clear contrast to the EU’s approach, adopted in 
2003, of  “preventive engagement” in order to counter threats such as instability, 
proliferation and “human emergencies” before they arise and would have direct 
consequences on the European Union. Following the US approach of  “meet-
ing challenges where they arise”, the EU has been aiming to set up more active 
policies to counter the new dynamic threats, to provide crisis management and 
conflict prevention and to develop “a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, 
and when necessary, robust intervention.”72 The “robust mandates” apply to the 
EU Mission “EUFOR RD CONGO,” which supports the UN Mission MONUC 
in Congo under Resolution 1671, as well as to the French, Irish, Italian, and Pol-
ish troops and the German navy which are patrolling the Lebanese coasts as part 
of  the UNIFIL mission. These missions are first, tentative steps towards this new, 
robust strategic culture.
The EU Arms Embargo—Setback for the Strategic Partnership
Ever since the declaration of  an EU-China “strategic partnership” in 2003, 
Brussels has been facing difficulties in explaining to Beijing why the EU arms 
embargo imposed on China in 1989 was kept in place in an desired “ever closer 
relationship”. Objectively seen it is understandable that Beijing continuously 
stresses that a partnership can hardly be called “strategic” when such a key area 
of  defence and technology is omitted from it by generally blocking the transfer 
of  weapons technology. Hence, in 2004 and 2005, Chinese officials intensified 
their arguments towards the EU to lift the embargo, albeit not to open up the 
Chinese market to European weapons manufacturers.73 Chinese officials claimed 
instead the need to create the political bilateral environment to get serious about 
the “strategic partnership”. Every single workshop, conference and or official EU-
China encounter taking place featured the arms embargo on its agenda. 
72 ESS (fn. 9), p. 11.
73 Yet, the mere prospect of  lifting the arms embargo put the Chinese side in a stronger position while negotiating with 
Russia about purchasing advanced weaponry and arms technology. See Frank Umbach, East Asian Arms Races—and 
Cooperation; Growth of  weapons heightens tensions, but can spur mutual aid, in: Internationale Politik (Transatlantic 
Edition), Summer 2005, p. 40.
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However, the conditions for the lifting of  the embargo are seen very differ-
ently from both parties: The PRC insists on Brussels to lift the embargo and in 
return Beijing agrees to expand its relations with the EU on all levels, including 
cooperation in the area of  security. On the European side, however, the lifting 
of  the embargo is linked to a number of  EU demands such as the ratification of  
the UN Convention on Political and Civil Rights, the release of  prisoners jailed 
during and after the Tiananmen Square massacre and last but not least verifiable 
evidence of  the improvement of  the human rights situation in China.
While the EU in 2005 announced in official statements “to promise to work to-
wards the lifting of  the embargo,” China understood that the EU “promised” to 
lift the embargo, overlooking the fact that the lift would be an intergovernmental 
decision by all Member States.74 Former EU Commission President Romano 
Prodi, the EU’s foreign policy chief  Javier Solana but also the German and the 
French head of  state have in their talks with their Chinese counterparts at times 
been less than clear about the fact that the lifting of  the embargo is subject to a 
number of  European (albeit non-official) pre-conditions to be met by the Chi-
nese side and a common decision of  all Member States. Furthermore, the em-
bargo will not be lifted until the EU has adopted a new and improved EU Code 
of  Conduct on Arms Exports. The existing code was agreed on in 1998 and is 
only politically binding.
The controversy about the arms embargo did not only highlight the lack of  unity 
within the Union and hence its lack of  influence, but it also lightened the differ-
ences in perception—while the Chinese side continues to point out the (bilateral) 
logical reasons for lifting the embargo, the Europeans ask on a rather parallel 
than common track of  dialogue for more understanding of  the constraints ap-
plied on them by the structure of  the EU’s system and by the necessity to find a 
solution within the broader context of  the EU’s external relations: The debacle 
taught the Europeans the lesson that their decisions as an emerging global actor 
do have repercussions in their relations with third parties, first and foremost the 
United States.
The “US Factor” in EU-China Relations
As outlined above, an analysis of  the envisioned EU-China strategic partnership 
is incomplete without taking the “US factor” into account as bilateral relations 
between Brussels and Beijing are influenced by their respective relations with 
Washington. During the very public transatlantic controversy over the lifting or 
74 Numerous conversations with Brussels-based Chinese diplomats, conducted by Axel Berkofsky, confirmed that Beijing 
was expecting to lift the embargo in accordance with the “promise” to do so.
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non-lifting of  the EU arms embargo imposed on China in 1989, it became clear 
that Washington is wary of  the quantitative and qualitative expansion of  EU-
China relations, especially in the area of  security. Even if  Brussels is neither ready 
nor willing to expand its relations at the expense of  its primal relationship with 
Washington, concerns amongst US policy makers remained.
The US, a vital supporter of  European integration from the very start through 
the successful Marshall Plan, has over the last decades been perceived as Europe’s 
closest and most important ally. For China, the US as the only remaining super-
power with a global sphere of  interest is China’s number one foreign policy prior-
ity as well as a competitor—in terms of  economic and political influence in the 
region and in the world as well as in terms of  ideology. Consequently, Chinese 
policies aim at counterbalancing and diminishing US power and influence, thus 
establishing what has been coined as a “multipolar” world by Chinese authori-
ties over recent years. In France, as mentioned before, China temporarily found 
an ally supporting this approach, even if  the approach was never fleshed out and 
was not supported on the EU level. Until the EU’s demonstration of  weakness 
when it was divided over the prospects of  war on Iraq, the Chinese side set great 
hopes on the EU developing into a possible future alternative to the US and a 
way for hedging the only remaining superpower. Chinese scholars point out that 
there has been a “new thinking” on the EU in China suggesting that the EU is 
not only the most important trade partner for China, but that the EU is also 
“moving quite rapidly towards a political power, as it now begins to invest con-
siderable energy in making a truly common foreign and security policy” and, first 
and foremost, that the EU has become an “‘independent strategic force’ which 
has increasingly shown its political willingness to challenge the American policies 
in the world.”75
In reality, however, the EU recognizes that the EU has neither the capabilities 
nor the political will to challenge or counterbalance US global influence. The ESS 
calls the transatlantic relationship “irreplaceable”. “One of  the core elements of  
the international system” the ESS reads, “is the transatlantic relationship. This is 
not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as 
a whole.”76 Also the security strategies of  the “Big Three”, that is Germany, the 
United Kingdom and France, state the relationship with the US as a cornerstone 
in their respective foreign policy strategies. Although France seems rhetorically to 
be closer to the Chinese perspectives, there is no tendency for even this country 
to deviate too radically from the “US first” policy. However, the two entities have 
75 See e. g. FENG Zhongping, China’s Policy towards Europe: Between the EU and the Big Three, paper presented at 
the conference International Politics of  EU-China relations, London, 20–21 April 2006, p. 3.
76 ESS (fn. 9), p. 9.
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in common that “both EU and China do not regard their counterparts as the 
most important partners,”77 but keep the US as the first foreign policy priority—a 
decisive factor that does weaken the prospects for a genuine “strategic partner-
ship” in practice. Although Beijing does acknowledge the importance of  the EU’s 
relations with Washington, it was and is concerned about the establishment of  
the EU-US “Strategic Dialogue on East Asia” in September 2004 and considered 
this dialogue hardly more than an US attempt to pressure the EU not to lift the 
weapons embargo.78 Indeed, it remains questionable whether the US would have 
dedicated resources and energy to discussing Asian security issues with Brussels 
without the controversies of  the embargo.
The term “strategic” in the US view has above all a military connotation and led 
to the fear by some US-American analysts and policy makers that the EU and 
China were about to launch an inter-regional military alliance aimed at reducing 
US strategic military influence in Europe and above all in Asia. Yet, such fears did 
not resonate significantly as it remains difficult to envisage an EU-China hard se-
curity or military security cooperation resembling e. g. US-Japanese or US-South 
Korean security cooperation.79 Indeed, discussions (beyond joint declarations 
expressing concern about the volatile security situation on the Korean Penin-
sula) on Asian regional security issues have hardly taken place between the EU 
and China so far and were not followed up by action. This suggests two things: 
a) Beijing may not be seeing a necessity to involve its alleged strategic partners 
in Brussels in Asian strategic and geo-political issues; and b) Brussels for its part 
may indeed not be interested in getting involved with its emerging security iden-
tity being firstly targeted on the near abroad and secondly, is only slowly widening 
its horizon beyond the business realm concerning more distant regions.
Different Statehoods—Different Paradigms—Common Strategy?
Last but not least the different nature of  the two players needs to be taken into 
account when discussing the opportunities and limits of  a strategic partnership. 
The People’s Republic of  China is a nation-state, governed by a central govern-
ment and hence provided with the possibility to forge policies across different 
policy fields, ranging from security to economics and development. The Eu-
ropean Union is a sui generis confederation of  states, set on a stumbling path 
towards a supranational state that will most probably not become a comparable 
nation-state in the near future—the discussion about the “finalité” of  European 
77 Xinning Song (fn. 64), p. 6–7.
78 Concerns were repeatedly pointed out by Chinese scholars and officials, e. g. at the 3rd EU-China Roundtable at The 
European Policy Centre, 9–10 October 2006, Brussels.
79 For the official view on China’s relations with the EU see China’s October 2003 EU Policy Paper (fn. 5); see also 
Opening New Phases of  China-EU Friendly Cooperation, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/wenJiabao 
cxezohy/t174793.htm>.
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integration, that was once more triggered off  by the then German foreign min-
ister Joschka Fischer0 and mirrored in the debates about the constitutional treaty, 
has still not and probably will never be concluded. Consequently, the European 
Union is a global actor in the making, where decisions concerning security are 
made in the intergovernmental second pillar, between the Member States’ gov-
ernments, excluding the European Commission, the European Parliament and 
the European Court of  Justice. Decisions in the field of  aid and trade are made 
in the first pillar, including all above mentioned supranational institutions and 
their competencies. Finally the national foreign policies of  the individual Mem-
ber States contribute to the complex picture of  a European foreign and security 
policy. These divisions of  competencies and power could, if  applied skillfully, 
contribute to pursuing successfully European interests. Taking into account the 
diversity of  interests between the EU Member States alone and the EU institu-
tions, history has proven so far that the dispersion of  competencies has rather 
led to a weakening of  the European Union—and to a less predictable partner for 
China in an envisaged strategic partnership.
0 Joschka Fischer, Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation – Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Integration. 
Rede am 12. Mai 2000 in der Humboldt-Universität in Berlin, in: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/info 
service/download/pdf/reden/2000/r000512a.pdf> (9.11.2004).
Mohamed el Ghitany
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Conclusion: “Common Wording, Differing Meanings”—More Declarations than Deeds
The above analysis of  the security concepts of  China, the European Union 
and the “Big Three” has shown that despite a congruence in terminology, the 
underlying ideologies and paradigms in each group cause differing interpreta-
tions of  these terms and undermine efforts to turn declarations into deeds, to 
apply theory to the practice of  day-to-day international relations. When it comes 
to security—and hence to the core of  states’ and the governing class’ interests: 
survival—a “strategic partnership” can only be of  limited practical value precisely 
because it is not able to “transcend the difference in ideology and social system” 
as desired by the Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao.
For both sides, fighting terrorism is a foreign and security policy priority, but Eu-
ropean and Chinese decision-makers differ in their perceptions of  who is to be 
labelled a terrorist—Europeans feel uncomfortable with the SCO’s equation of  
“terrorism, separatism and extremism” and view the Uygurs in Xinjiang province 
differently than their Chinese counterparts do. They also differ in their percep-
tions of  the root causes of  terrorism, with the European side putting heavy 
emphasis on its intra-societal roots and the influence of  a low level of  develop-
ment on its spread. Consequently, the targets as well as the strategies against these 
enemies differ.
The proliferation of  weapons of  mass destruction is of  major concern for both 
sides and has even led to the signing of  a joint paper on non-proliferation. How-
ever, with a closer look the interests of  the two sides differ again too much to 
provide valid ground for any further activities: The Europeans follow to a great 
extent the US-American policies, including joining the US-led Proliferation Se-
curity Initiative (PSI). The PRC for its part is determined to catch up in terms of  
military hardware and technology with the West, rapidly and significantly increas-
ing its own defence spending. Being subject to an EU and US weapons embargo, 
Beijing imports more than 90% of  its weapons and weapon technology from 
Russia, while pursuing sales to Pakistan and Iran. 
There are also fundamental differences to how the EU and China view North 
Korea. While China remains North Korea’s most important ally, having in recent 
years turned into Pyongyang’s most important supplier of  energy and significantly 
increased its investments on the peninsula, the Europeans are above all concerned 
about Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programmes. Even though the EU is—like 
China and despite the nuclear and missile crisis—committed to its economic 
engagement course towards North Korea, Brussels and Beijing mostly pursue 
different strategies regarding how to achieve this engagement with a regime that 
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has demonstrated its determination and desperation with its October nuclear test. 
The impression that China sees no real role for the EU in the field of  security in 
Asia is supported by the fact that China—like the other participating countries—
has not advocated EU participation in the Six-Party Talks seeking to negotiate a 
solution to North Korea’s nuclear crisis. EU-China security cooperation on Asian 
security is hardly on the agenda of  neither Beijing’s nor Brussels’ policy makers.
EU-China cooperation in coping with instabilities, regional conflicts and failing 
states will increase multilaterally due to the increasing number of  UN operations 
in this area, but will remain nevertheless limited bilaterally by the two sides’ fun-
damentally different perceptions of  the causes of  and cures for instabilities. Fur-
thermore, cooperation will also be overridden by more important foreign policy 
priorities—as long as China is willing to co-operate with dictatorial regimes and 
failing states in Africa and the Middle East in order to secure its access to natural 
resources, a common approach in dealing with failing states is not a realistic issue 
on the agenda of  EU-China relations. 
The most realistic area for EU-China security cooperation could be in dealing 
with the so-called “new challenges” that deviate from the traditional notion of  
security and are part of  what is commonly being referred to as “human security”: 
disaster management and disaster relief  in the course of  pandemics and environ-
mental catastrophes offer promising common ground for cooperation. SARS and 
the Avian Flu were striking examples of  epidemics breaking out in one country 
and having an impact beyond national borders, thus requiring joint efforts by the 
international community to deal with the crisis and its aftermath. 
Why can ideology not be transcended in the other areas, as suggested by Chinese 
Premier Wen Jinbao? As mentioned above, security refers to the very core of  
states’ interest: survival—not only survival of  the state, but also survival of  the 
ruling class and survival of  the system of  governance. Hence, security strate-
gies are always a part of  a comprehensive ideology which envisages a state of  
“finalité” in the undetermined future. Security cooperation needs to be based on 
trust that derives from a common world view. The Europeans have subscribed 
to a “Western view” of  international society, with the end goal being democrati-
cally governed states with a high status for the rights of  the individual, including 
human rights—as stated in the European Charter on Fundamental Rights and 
in every European state’s constitution. Furthermore, despite all arguments about 
distance from and proximity to the only remaining superpower, Europe (“old” 
and “new”) has aligned itself  with the United States and shares to a great extent 
its priorities and paradigms. With the US being the natural counterpart to China 
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as an emerging global power that perceives the world in a more traditional power 
politics system, this alignment prevents closer cooperation in the core area of  
security.
Even in the area where Europeans and Chinese seem to be much closer than 
US-Americans and Europeans—in their preference for multilateralism—their 
perceptions of  multilateralism differ to the extent that the paradigms differ. For 
Europeans, being shaped by the multilateral EU policy-process, multilateralism 
means finding compromises between weaker and stronger states and backing 
these solutions with the legitimacy provided by an assembly of  almost all nation 
states on the globe. For China, regionalism offers a chance to create a benign en-
vironment for its economic development, while multilateralism offers a chance to 
pursue power politics in the UN Security Council at eye level with the US without 
being as strong as the US. The differences in ideology also lead to the different 
connotation in each country’s terminology.
Putting all these factors together, Europe and China do share numerous security 
concerns on paper, but the differences in paradigms and ideology—and hence the 
connotations of  these terms—will continue to stand in the way of  closer com-
prehensive cooperation in the field of  security. Most cooperation will be achieved 
in the “new security” challenges such as pandemics and environmental disasters. 
The differences, however, will de-facto exclude far-reaching security cooperation 
in most other areas from the envisioned EU-China strategic partnership.
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